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Abstract
This thesis deals with the role of opium as a conflict resource in the Myanmar civil war.
It poses the question whether some actors have developed an interest in deliberately
prolonging the conflict because they perceive war as more profitable than peace. The
topic has been chosen because there is little to be found in the literature which influence
opium has had on the longevity and intensity of the conflicts in Myanmar. The thesis
therefore aims to shed light on some of the actors and structures which are connected to
the narcotics trade and investigates whether some actors sabotage or have incentives to
sabotage the Nationwide Ceasefire Process (NCA) that is still ongoing. The thesis uses
the concept of spoilers in peace processes to analyze the conflict. The method is framed
by using theories on the role of natural resources on civil wars and on shadow and war
economies and black markets. The thesis also makes references to peace and conflict
research concepts such as structural violence. The data used comes from five expert
interviews, reports by for example the UNODC and the Transnational Institute (TNI),
academic literature and news resources. The study found that currently nobody engaged
in the narcotics trade has an interest ins sabotaging the NCA for several reasons, one is
that a potential ceasefire is unlikely to affect the opium business at all. On the contrary,
many former insurgent groups'  drug trade activities have started to thrive since they
agreed to a ceasefire with the government. This means that a ceasefire, understood as a
form of  negative  peace  in  this  thesis,  is  perceived  more  profitable  than  continued
warfare.  The  NCA might  be  still  threatened  by  actors  because  of  other  reasons,
especially political  ones. Spoilers might still  emerge in the future. The study results
point towards other areas, especially the conflict  potential  of other natural resources
such as gemstones and timber as well as to the political reasons for spoiling.
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11. Introduction
The thesis at hand is a piece of academic writing embedded in the discipline of peace
and conflict  research.  Since work on it  began in the form of a research proposal in
spring 2014, the original loosely defined topic has changed a lot until it arrived at the
current state. While the original idea of doing research on the role of natural resources
in the conflicts that take place in Myanmar has remained the same, the topic itself has
gotten more and more elaborate and precise over the course of the last year.
The result is a thesis which investigates the role that opium plays as a conflict
resource  in  Myanmar  and  whether  those  who  draw profit  from the  narcotics  trade
developed incentives to sabotage any alleviation of conflict because they perceive war
as more profitable than peace.  This question is  approached by using the concept of
spoilers in peace processes which has been first formulated as a comprehensive model
for conflict analysis by Stephen Stedman in 1997. The spoiler concept is embedded in a
framework of theories about the role of natural resources in conflict and shadow and
war  economies  and  black  markets.  The  thesis  draws  furthermore  on  more  general
theories  of  academic  peace and conflict  research,  especially Johan Galtung's  classic
theories of negative and positive peace and direct and indirect (structural) violence.
History  plays  an  important  role  in  this  piece  of  research.  Its  purpose  is  to
contextualize the myriad small and large-scale conflicts taking place in Myanmar today,
often shortened to the singular “Myanmar civil war.” The historical chapter introduces
to reader not only to the recent history of Myanmar that has led to the situation the
country faces today but also to the history of opium in Asia, the impact and legacy of
colonial empires as well as early and contemporary forms of East and Southeast Asian
capitalism.
The reasons for the choice of this specific topic lie in the perception that the
question of whether economic motives play a role in the longevity of the Myanmar
conflicts  remains underexplored.  While studies acknowledge and address the role of
opium as a financial resource to purchase arms and pay soldiers, the fewest pieces of
writing go beyond this point and ask if the thriving narcotics trade poses a significant
threat  to  any conflict  resolution  efforts  because  peace  might  be  perceived  as  being
detrimental to the own interest, business or worldview.
2Myanmar as a case study has been chosen because of a personal interest in the
country and because most studies that focus on the role of natural resources in conflicts
deal with either  different resources (diamonds,  hydrocarbons) or different cases (for
example Sierra Leone and Liberia). Both opium and Myanmar play only minor roles in
most studies on natural resources and conflict.
Opium is not the only conflict resource in Myanmar. The choice to focus on
opium is based on the perception that it is more than just a conflict resource used to
maintain or improve military capabilities. Opium has a multifaceted history in Myanmar
and other countries in Southeast Asia and is intrinsically connected to culture (cultural
and medical  uses and leisure pursuit  are  prevalent),  subsistence farming,  support  of
livelihoods,  poverty  and  structural  violence.  In  addition  comes  opium's  direct
connection  to  the  international  drug trade,  a  globalized  multi-billion  dollar  business
which dwarfs the illegal trade with timber or gemstones, two other natural resources
available in Myanmar.
The aspects of poverty and structural violence are especially important because
of the peace and conflict  research context in which this thesis  in written.  Gemstone
mining and timber  logging undoubtedly constitute  a  threat  to  the livelihoods of the
people living in Myanmar's peripheries especially through environmental degradation.
However,  the  scope  that  opium  cultivation  and  drug  refining  have  taken  over  the
decades and the predatory taxation of villagers as well as the addiction problems and the
HIV epidemic that go along with it pose a more direct threat to the well-being of the
most  vulnerable  segments  of  the  populace.  Opium,  therefore,  affects  the  living
conditions of the people in Myanmar's peripheries in multiple ways and has a much
greater impact than other natural conflict resources.
The choice of opium as prime object  of research interest  does not,  however,
mean  that  opium is  deemed  more  interesting  or  more  important  than  for  example
gemstones or timber. A choice had to be made due to the limited space of the thesis and
including all possible resources would have exceeded the limit. Other natural resources
are  undoubtedly just  as  interesting  and  should  be  considered  in  future  studies,  too,
especially because of the severe environmental consequences of the mining and logging
industries which affect humans, flora and fauna alike. It is likely that large-scale logging
will  become  more  important  as  a  study object  in  the  future  since  waning  military
conflict in some regions of Myanmar has brought the timber trade under the control of
the  government  (or  the  military)  and  future  external  investments,  especially  from
3neighboring countries, might exacerbate environmental degradation and thus spark new
conflicts.
The thesis is divided in seven chapters of which most have several subchapters.
After  these  introductory  remarks,  the  thesis  continues  with  an  introduction  to  the
research  objective,  the  methodology,  the  research  questions  and  hypotheses  and  a
presentation of the data used. The following chapters introduce the reader to the theories
used in this thesis (chapter three), followed by the aforementioned chapter about the
historical context (chapter four). The fifth chapter is the analysis part which discusses
both actors and structural components relevant in the spoiler concept, two items the
reader  will  learn  more  about  in  chapter  three.  After  finishing  the  analysis  and  the
discussion of the results, chapter six turns to a reflection on the spoiler concept as a tool
for  conflict  analysis.  It  furthermore  discusses  one  of  the  major  points  of  criticism
leveled at the concept, namely that it  has a powerful normative foundation and only
works in context with the liberal peace building paradigm. Finally, small changes are
proposed  to  address  this  criticism before  finishing  the  thesis  with  a  conclusion  in
chapter seven.
2. Research Objective and Research Methodology
This thesis is a case study of the civil war in Myanmar and uses a qualitative research
approach. A qualitative approach is taken due to the design of the study and the research
question which will be both introduced down below.
Before proceeding to the literature review and the theory used in this thesis, it is
imperative to explain why and how the study was conducted. The following section will
introduce the thesis' research objective and methodology. It includes two assumptions
which are underlying the thesis  topic  and functioned as  a  source of  inspiration,  the
research question as well  as the research hypotheses.  A subsection presents  detailed
information  on the sources  used as  well  as  on the  five  expert  interviews that  were
conducted for the purpose of this study.
2.1. Research Objective and Case Selection
The aim of this study is to find out whether the peace process in Myanmar, currently in
the form of several rounds of talks about a nationwide ceasefire, is threatened by actors
4who deliberately attempt to prolong the civil war for economic reasons. The actors that
will  be looked at  have  a  background in the  drug business  that  revolves  around the
cultivation  of  opium and  the  trade  of  its  derivatives  heroin  and  amphetamine-type
stimulants (ATS). More about the drugs and the background later.
The  case  of  the  Myanmar  civil  war,  and  especially  the  aspect  of  the  drug
business,  has  been chosen because  of  gaps  in  the  literature.  The choice  of  topic  is
therefore in  line with George and Bennett  (2005:  74),  who state  with regard to  the
identification of gaps in the literature that the research objective
“should be embedded in a well informed assessment that identifies gaps in
the current state of knowledge, acknowledges contradictory theories, and
notes  inadequacies  in  the  evidence  for  existing  theories.  In  brief,  the
investigator needs to make the case that the proposed research will make a
significant contribution to the field.”
Not much can be found in the literature on the consequences that the economic and
political interests behind the drug trade have for peace-making. While it is common
notion that drug money is used to pay soldiers and purchase military equipment and
while plenty of research is done on the scope, conditions and reasons behind opium
cultivation, no piece of literature that could be found moves beyond this point and ask
whether the immense profits that are generated in the drug business give incentives to
prevent  the  resolution  of  the  conflict  situation.  This  reasoning  is  based  on  the
assumption that the civil  war created and still  creates the conditions for unregulated
shadow economic activity which includes the trade with opium and its derivatives. It is
unlikely that drug trade of similar scope would have developed under peaceful or at
least less chaotic and violent circumstances. Myriad amounts of actors control small and
large swathes of land and the central government does not exert control over the entire
territory,  meaning that  Myanmar is  a  political  and military carpet  rug.  The political
situation is explained in detail later. At this point it is important to mention that the
choice to focus on the drug issue means that other aspects are disregarded and are not
included in the thesis due to the necessity to focus on a specific aspect of the conflict.
As much as a full account of all natural resources, their role in the Myanmar civil war
and the  potential  to  induce  actors  to  spoil  would  be  desirable,  it  would  extend the
maximum length of this thesis by far. Jade, timber, gemstones and the abundance of
other natural resources that can be found in Myanmar would, undoubtedly, make an
interesting topic for another Master's thesis or for future research projects.
The attempt to fill in a gap in the literature has thus pointed towards other gaps
5and opened up new questions that are worth pursuing. A more comprehensive image of
the obstacles to peace in Myanmar is certainly necessary since much of has remained
underexplored  or  has  not  been  explored  at  all.  These  gaps  and  new  questions  are
addressed in more detail towards the end of the thesis and might inspire future research
projects.
In order to find out whether there are such actors who attempt to undermine the
ceasefire negotiations or its results, the concept of spoilers in peace processes has been
chosen as theoretical framework. As a comprehensive concept it was first introduced by
Stephen Stedman in 1997. The thesis, however, is not limited to the application of the
spoiler concept to the Myanmar civil war. It furthermore discusses the advantages and
disadvantages the of the concept while reflecting on the limits of the thesis' research. As
the concept is targeted with plenty of criticism, it is a vital part of the thesis to make
remarks about the criticism and acknowledge its limits. The final chapter is an attempt
to contribute something to the concept itself which, in its current form, has a powerful
and  potentially  limiting  normative  foundation.  The  term  'spoiler'  implies  already  a
strong normative judgment of certain behavior. This thesis, however, will henceforth
stick to the word 'spoiler' and addresses this controversial issue later.
In this thesis, the spoiler concept is framed by using theory on the role of natural
resources in civil  wars and theory on shadow and war economies,  or black markets
respectively.  The  thesis  is  inspired  by  two  assumptions  about  humans  and  human
interaction derived from personal observation of the Myanmar case and other conflicts.
The  first  assumption  is  derived  from the  observation  that  human  beings  are
remarkably adaptive and are able to adapt even to civil war situations. People learn to
cope with an environment in which war is either happening or is occurring frequently
and they evidently manage to maintain a life amidst the most hostile environments. The
second assumption is that no matter how dire a situation is, somebody will find ways to
draw material or immaterial profit from it. This can be or example money by engaging
in (or even creating) a thriving shadow or war economy or political power that can be
assumed amidst political instability in (civil) war zones. This phenomenon is not limited
to Myanmar but can be observed across the globe in different settings where warlords or
gangs  control  large  swathes  of  land  and  parts  of  the  economy,  for  example  in
Afghanistan. This phenomenon is also acknowledged by UNEP (2009: 11) in its report
on the role of natural resources and the environment in conflicts.
The two phenomenons are partly overlapping in the sense that drawing profit
6from a dire situation represents a form of adaptation.
The  two  assumptions  underlying  the  research  project  at  hand  should  not  be
understood as a theoretical foundation of the thesis but rather as a source of inspiration
that has influenced the choice of topic, the research question and the method. They are
thus not part of the thesis as such. The thesis itself is based on empirical data drawn
from a variety of sources which will be introduced later on.
2.2. Research Question and Research Hypotheses
The research objective is formulated as an empirical research question whose answer is
sought  by  testing  four  research  hypotheses.  In  addition  to  the  empirical  research
question,  the  thesis  pursues  also  a  theoretical  research  question  that  deals  with  the
spoiler concept and its limitations. The empirical research question reads as follows:
Is the nationwide ceasefire agreement process in Myanmar threatened by
actors with a background in the the drug business of the Golden Triangle
who intend to prolong the conflict for economic or power political purposes
by using spoiling behavior?
To answer this question, four research hypotheses have been devised in the style of
questions. Although research hypotheses are usually not formulated as questions, the
question  style  is  believed  to  be  beneficial  because  hypotheses  are  used  as  guiding
questions for the thesis whose single answers, when combined, will provide an answer
to the research question. Their character allows “yes” or “no” answers and thus, they
can be falsified or verified.
Hypothesis  I  deals  with the  environment  and structures  that  enable  actors  to
make profit in the first place:
Did  the  civil  war  in  Myanmar  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  thriving
shadow  and  black  market  economy  and  did  it  make  especially  the
impoverished peripheries in North and Northwestern Burma dependent on
illicit narcotics production?
Hypothesis II, then, is about the role of actors, the scope of their influence and their
economic and political enterprises:
Did some individuals and organizations in Myanmar become particularly
powerful stakeholders within the country and beyond? And did they create
businesses relying on war and conflict such as illicit narcotic production
and drug trafficking?
Whether  the lifestyles  and businesses of the stakeholders  give incentives  to  prevent
peace is asked in Hypothesis III: 
7Did these  stakeholders  develop an interest  in  prolonging  the  conflict  to
maintain their businesses and their lifestyles?
Lastly, Hypothesis IV asks the deciding question :
Do these stakeholders try to sabotage the peace efforts?
The answers to these questions are derived from a variety of sources including academic
literature, reports by UN institutions and others, news resources and online articles by
regional and international media and expert interviews.
The spoiler concept is primarily condensed from academic articles that present a
variety of possible perspectives on the phenomenon of spoilers in peace processes. The
different models of the spoiler concept are discussed and then assembled into a fitting
model for the analysis of the Myanmar civil war. In this model, the characteristic of
actors (the decision-making of individuals and organizations) and opportunity structures
are considered independent variables that influence the possible outcomes in a peace
process.  This  means  that  the  dependent  variable  is  whether  or  not  actors  resort  to
spoiling behavior.
The  spoiler  concept  is  embedded  in  a  theoretical  context  that  draws  on  the
literature dealing with the role of natural resources in civil wars and with shadow and
war  economies  and  black  markets.  Later  sections  introduce  a  variety  of  different
relevant issues such as the importance of poverty for the opium cultivation, neglected
borderlands  as  incubators  of  civil  strife  and  shadow  economic  activity  as  well  as
different  theories  on  the  role  of  natural  resources  with  regard  to  their  impact  on
duration, intensity and onset of civil wars.
Plenty of literature is available on Myanmar, its history, the civil war and the
political  and economic situation.  Researchers write not only books and in academic
journals  but  also  in  newspapers  and  as  consultants.  They  provide  the  information
needed to conduct this study. In addition come reports on the drug business in Myanmar.
The Transnational Institute (TNI) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) conduct regular studies on the scope of the opium cultivation, the reasons
behind it and the drug business, providing empirical data and numbers of the opium
business.
English online news from Myanmar and Southeast  Asia  are  used to  buttress
arguments and to include up-to-date information on the situation in Myanmar and the
Nationwide  Ceasefire  Agreement  (NCA)  talks  between  the  government  and  over  a
dozen of ethnic armed groups (EAGs). The current situation is changing day by day
8with frequent violent encounters taking place between the Tatmadaw and rebel groups
while the NCA negotiations are continuing. While some actions could be considered as
spoiling behavior, only those who have a clear economic motivation are dealt with in
this thesis.
The data is supplemented with information gathered from interviews with five
renowned experts in the field. The conditions of the interviews were agreed beforehand.
None  of  the  interviewees  objected  to  being  quoted  and  cited  by  name  or  to  the
conversation being recorded.  One interviewee stressed that  the information gathered
from the  interview may only  be  used  for  the  Master's  thesis  at  hand.  All  but  one
interview were conducted via video chat and internet telephone service Skype, the other
was conducted face-to-face at the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) in Finland.
Other  interview requests  have  not  been  answered,  one  person  denied  the  interview
request but provided additional sources and input via e-mail. The interviewees are (in
chronological order):
1. Tom Kramer, researcher at TNI, 2015-01-15
2. Matti Ojanperä, researcher and consultant, 2015-01-17 (face-to-face interview)
3. Ashley South, independent writer and consultant, 2015-01-23
4. Mikael Gravers, researcher at Copenhagen University, 2015-04-16
5. Martin Smith, researcher and journalist, 2015-04-20
All interviewees have years of experience of working in and on Myanmar and have
connections also in the ethnic peripheries. The information gathered in the interviews
are used as supplementary information to buttress the arguments made in later parts of
the thesis, and are not analyzed with specific tools such as content analysis. They are
used as additional information much like a newspaper source. Three of the interviewees
written work is also used as sources throughout the thesis.
The theoretical research question poses a question to the spoiler concept itself.
The aforementioned powerful normative underpinnings of the spoiler concept, reflected
already in the term 'spoiler', are scrutinized. The goal is to question whether the concept
is actually a viable theoretical approach to analyze obstacles in peace processes. The
notion  of  spoilers  in  itself  constitutes  a  judgment  of  an  actors  behavior  that  is
questionable  since  behavior  or  the  perception  of  behavior  respectively  is  always
inherently  subjective  or  at  least  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  objectify.  What  one
person deems irrational and an act of spoiling might be perceived by others as perfectly
rational and justified. This problematic aspect is by far not confined to this specific
9instance of research but permeates research in social sciences. Since human beings are
not  robots  that  always  act  and  react  in  exactly  the  same  way  according  to
preprogrammed  sets  of  behavior,  research  in  social  science  is  always  subjected  to
certain limits. Human behavior does not follow natural laws that can be predicted and
calculated and tested through experiments.1 Acknowledging the subjective character of
human behavior and the fact that different human beings perceive behavior in different
ways is a precondition for research or even practical methods to end conflicts, such as
mediation.2 So the theoretical research question scrutinizes whether or not the spoiler
concept  is  a  suitable  method  to  analyze  conflict  and  whether  the  normative
underpinnings limit the concept.
The research is carried out in the a similar vein other authors have used the
spoiler concept to analyze conflicts (such as Stedman 1997 and Greenhill and Major
2006/2007). The concept demands a different approach than other concepts in which
typically a historical context is presented, followed by an analysis in an own chapter.
This thesis also features a contextual chapter about Myanmar, its history and the history
of opium in Asia and Myanmar. This is done mainly to give the reader an introduction
to the conflict and the context. However, the content in the contextual chapter had to be
chosen  carefully  because  the  analysis  chapter  keeps  introducing  new  contextual
information that is analyzed by using the spoiler concept and which was not mentioned
in  the  preceding  chapters.  The  contextual  chapter  thus  avoids  information  that  is
relevant for the analysis in order to prevent repetition. In the analysis chapter, structures
and actors are analyzed against the backdrop of a specifically designed set of properties
of the concept which are introduced in the subsequent chapter.
3. Theoretical Framework
This chapter and its subchapters introduce the theoretical background of this thesis. It
starts off with a theoretical consideration of the role that natural resources play in civil
wars. This is necessary because the following subchapters, which deal with shadow and
war economies and black markets as well as the spoiler concept used to analyze the
Myanmar civil war, demand an understanding of the importance of natural resources for
1 Experiments are possible but are subjected to ethical limits. Experiments such as the famous Stanford 
prison experiment in 1971 are nowadays impossible, for good reasons.
2 Porteus, Ann: Conflict Mediation Guidelines; Source: 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/resed/resed/staffresources/RM/training/conflict.html, last accessed: 
2015-04-28.
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both functioning shadow economic structures and spoilers who may draw on natural
resources and neglected and impoverished borderlands. It should become clear that all
three,  natural resources,  shadow economies and spoilers,  are related and interlocked
topics that are difficult to separate since they are mutually dependent.
3.1. The Role of Natural Resources in Civil Wars
The role of natural  resources and the environment in violent  conflicts,  notably civil
wars, has moved to the center of attention in academic research (see for example SIPRI
Yearbook 2011) and policy making (UNEP Report  2009) in  the  last  25 years.  This
coincided  with  the  end  of  the  East-West  Conflict  and  the  consequent  significant
scrapping of support  by the United States  and Soviet Union/Russia  for their  former
protégés around the world (Le Billon 2004: 1). As a result of this, insurgent groups,
warlords and other actors that had formerly been engaged in proxy wars had to secure
new ways of funding their  activities  and many civil  wars became increasingly self-
financing in nature. New actors emerging after 1990 were in dire need of financial and
military resources, too (Ballentine & Nitzschke 2005: 2). As a result any of them turned
to  the  exploitation  of  lucrative  natural  resources,  especially  diamonds  and  gems,
narcotics,  timber  and oil  (Ross 2004: 40).  Those who managed to procure financial
revenues  independent  of  external  assistance,  mainly  by  extortion  or  by  exploiting
lucrative natural resources, are able to behave differently inasmuch as their financial
resources  are  no  longer  tied  to  specific  conditions.  In  fact,  Tom  Keating,  who
specializes in how terrorists secure funding, posits that such groups may be the most
dangerous ones.3
It is imperative, therefore, to understand the role that natural resources and the
environment have played and still play in various violent conflicts and civil wars across
the globe, both for academic research and policy making. Without including the variable
of natural resources in conflict analysis, conflicts such as the Myanmar civil war cannot
be  understood  in  their  entirety and will  ultimately fail  to  provide  an  adequate,  all-
encompassing analysis, which, in turn, will compromise any solution to the conflict. 
The  dynamics  of  resource-driven  violent  conflict  constitute  a  key  aspect  of
conflict analysis because the exploitation and looting of lucrative natural resources open
3 Gehlen, Martin: The sponsors of the IS jihadists, in: ZEIT Online 2014-06-25; Source: 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2014-07/islamischer-staat-gotteskrieger-finanzierung-syrien-irak, 
last accessed: 2015-01-28
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up opportunities for conflict parties to amass considerable wealth, which, in turn gives
incentives to abandon political goals and concentrate on business. In fact, these business
opportunities may fundamentally alter the goals and therefore the behavior of conflict
parties (UNEP Report 2009: 11), transforming soldiers and armies with political goals
into entrepreneurs and businesses which assign only minor roles to political goals or
abandon  them entirely.  Thus,  natural  resources  may  give  rise  to  those  actors  who
develop  an  interest  in  deliberately  prolonging  conflict  for  economic  ends.  These
spoilers sabotage peace processes because, as Ballentine & Nitzschke (2005: 3) put it,
there  can  be  “more  to  war  than  winning.”  The  spoiling  opportunities  that  natural
resources offer are addressed by several other authors (Pugh & Cooper 2004: 35; 38;
Ross  2004:  43;  Lujala  2010:  16)  and  are  treated  in  the  subsequent  chapter  about
spoilers. 
However, as Ross (2004: 44) points out, there is an alternative theory other than
prolonging conflict for economic reasons. This has to be mentioned for two reasons: the
first is for the sake of completeness, the second is the relevance for the Myanmar civil
war.  This other theory posits that natural resources  shorten conflict  because conflict
parties expect peace to be more profitable than continued war. Indeed, there have been
instances  of  collusion  where  conflict  parties  ignored  their  differences  and  jointly
exploited natural resources (Ibid.: 54). While the motivation is still of economic nature,
shortening a conflict is the exact opposite of the far more popular notion that natural
resources exacerbate and prolong conflict.  This is  a phenomenon that has also been
observed  in  Myanmar.  In  later  sections,  this  thesis  will  demonstrate  that  both
prolongation  and  shortening  of  conflict  due  to  exploitation  and  looting  of  natural
resources have been part  of the Myanmar civil  war,  despite  the ostensible mutually
exclusive character of this claim.
Civil wars have, of course, different dynamics, natures and reasons why they
break out. As not all types that have been identified in the literature are important for
this thesis, only the relevant information is dealt with in this chapter. Fearon (2004:
277), who has compared 128 civil wars in the time span from 1945 to 1999, found that
those  featuring  peripheral  insurgencies involving  rural  based  guerrillas  near  state
borders  and those  featuring  rebels  with  access  to  revenue from contraband such as
opium  or  coca  and  diamonds,  are  on  average  long  and  difficult  to  end.  Both  are
characteristics of the Myanmar civil war. Fearon continues by stating that peripheral
insurgencies are military contests aimed at rendering the other side unable to fight. This
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often  leads  to  the  fighting becoming drawn out,  compared with  those civil  wars  in
which  combatants  fight  for  control  of  the  state  and the  capital.  These  conflicts  are
usually quite short-lived and witness quick military defeat of one of the conflict parties.
Especially in cases where the non-state parties have access to revenues from natural
resources, a mutual hurting stalemate can be delayed or avoided entirely, a phenomenon
that can also be found in the writings of other authors (Ibid: 277; Ross 2004: 43; Pugh
& Cooper 2004: 35, Ballentine & Nitzschke 2005: 5f.). Lujala (2010: 16) suggests that
notably  low  intensity  conflicts  with  few  casualties  but  of  long  duration  provide
beneficial circumstances for insurgents to exploit easily lootable resources, facilitating
the procurement of military resources to sustain or even improve military capabilities.
Drugs, like opium or coca, are one of these easily lootable resources and are
typically subsumed under the umbrella of natural resources because they are grown and
harvested as crops by poor subsistence farmers who then are taxed by insurgent groups,
warlords and other actors to secure revenue. While no evidence can be found suggesting
that drugs are related to the onset of civil wars, they do exert a significant influence on
their duration and are therefore a factor that prolongs them (Ross 2004: 38; 52). This
means that drugs do not constitute a motivation for people to pick up arms and fight for
them as it has been observed in some cases with oil fields or diamond mines, but they
usually come into play in later stages in a conflict when insurgents face a shortage in
funding. The role that drugs play in sustaining insurgencies and conflict is highlighted
in all studies concerned with natural resources. According to Le Billon (2004: 23), drugs
are among the easily marketable resources that have been connected to conflict in the
1990s in at least 20 countries. This resonates with the findings of UNEP (2009: 11)
which found that opium has played a major role in fueling violent conflict in Myanmar
and Afghanistan.
The reason why drugs embody such a convenient commodity for insurgents is
that they are easily lootable and transportable and do not require any special equipment
or  training  apart  from farming  skills,  which  is  usually  not  done  by the  insurgents
themselves but by civilian subsistence farmers. They therefore generate easy revenue
for any group controlling the territory where opium or coca are grown as cash crops. In
addition, they also provide advantages (welfare structures) to the farmers growing the
crops (Ballentine & Nitzschke 2005: 5).
Natural resources such opium and products refined from it quickly become a part
of shadow and war economies. The sprawling of such economic structures coincides
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with  the  spread  of  violence  against  civilians  and  other  military  actors.  Markets  of
violence emerge  in  which  violence  is  the  dominant  medium serving  economic  and
power  political  purposes.  Warlords  sit  at  their  center  as  the  principal  agents  and
operators (Elwert, no date available). Drugs are thus intrinsically connected to violence
and shadow economic activity (as well as war economies) and may constitute a major
source  of  financing  for  spoilers.  Both  the  aspects  of  welfare  structures  and  the
interconnection with shadow economies are covered in more detail in the subsequent
chapter about shadow economies.
3.2. Shadow and War Economies and Black Markets
The Myanmar case illustrates perhaps like no other what size and importance economic
activities located outside the formal and legally accepted economic structures can reach.
In much parts of the Western world such activities are seen as a deviation from legal
economic  activities  and  participation  in  them is  considered  as  inherently  irrational
(Pugh & Cooper 2004: 6f.). On the contrary, participating in shadow economies and
their black markets is a rational thing to do for many people (this aspect is covered
down below).  Furthermore,  shadow economic activities  are  not  confined to  conflict
zones  or  developing  countries.  They  constitute  an  integral  part  of  each  and  every
economy in the world, including industrial countries.4 What varies from case to case is
the proportion of shadow economic activities of the whole economy. In the light of this
thought, Schneider and Enste (2002: 7) introduce the concept of  dual economy which
posits  that  each  and  every  economy  has  two  sectors:  an  official  sector  (the  first
economy) and an unofficial sector with all its informal economic activities (the second
economy). The latter may constitute the bigger part of the economy in some countries,
especially those plagued by conflict. This is due to the lack of state assessment in the
early stages of smaller economies and the widespread economic activity that focuses on
self-sustenance (Ibid.: 29f.). The size of the shadow economy in industrial countries is
significantly  below  50  percent,  for  example  in  2012  the  proportion  of  the  shadow
economy in Germany was around 13.3 percent while the proportion for Greece was
around 24 percent  according to  estimates  of  the  EU Commission  (EU Commission
2012: 6).
4 Organized crime exists also in Europe and North America: for example drug markets, prostitution and 
human-trafficking. Other black market activities are for example purchasing services and paying in 
cash, avoiding taxation.
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The misunderstanding of shadow economic structures and activities is reflected
in  the  definition  provided by the  German Council  of  Economic  Experts  from 1980
which defines a shadow economic activity as a “decision against the official norms and
formal institutions for economic activity” as well as in Stützel's 1980 description as an
“emigration  from  the  established  ways  of  working”  (Ibid.:  7).  In  how  far  these
understandings are not only inaccurate but also inappropriate to understand life in non-
industrial, impoverished countries and conflict zones and even potentially dangerous to
vulnerable populations is addressed later in this chapter.
What, then, is a shadow economy or shadow economic activity? For this thesis,
the  term 'shadow  economy'  is  understood  as  the  part  of  a  country's  economy that
revolves around mostly illegal activities such as the smuggling of (consumer) goods in
and out of a country and their vending, the provision of unofficial and untaxed services,
gunrunning, and drug production and selling. The last two are especially relevant for the
term  war economy and will  be explained in  more detail  below. These activities  are
officially and for the most part not accepted as part of the 'formal' or 'legal' economy of
a country (or of the first economy, in Schneider's and Enste's terms). Henceforth, the
term 'legal economy' will be used to denote what is accepted in most parts of the world
as legitimate business regulated by state laws and subject to taxation by a state whereas
the term 'shadow economy' will refer to those above-listed activities which evade state
regulation and taxation and are deemed illegal  and illegitimate,  or in  Pickhardt  and
Shinnick's (2008: 123) words:
“those economic activities and the income derived from them that circumvent
[...] government regulation, taxation or observation.”
The state remains the prime reference object of legal economic activities, but
shadow economies, due to fact that they operate outside of a state regulated sphere, are
not  limited  by  state  borders  and  have  an  inherently  cross-border  and  international
dimension. This will be addressed in the following paragraphs. It is important to note
that not only insurgents may profit from this lack of regulation and transparency. There
are also instances, for example in Myanmar, in which governments themselves have
tapped into the business opportunities of the shadow economy. This should be kept in
mind as it will be of importance later in the analysis chapter of the thesis.
The term 'black market' is used in a similar way to that of 'shadow economy'.
However,  while  shadow  economy  describes  the  whole  economic  complex,  black
markets refer more to the actual economic action between actors on an illegal market
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place. The term 'market place' does not refer to a concrete location but to an abstract
concept  of  it,  for  example  “arms  can  be  illegally  purchased  on  Myanmar's  black
markets.” This does not denote a concrete location but it implies the existence of illegal
structures through which illegal goods such as arms can be acquired.
A war economy can be understood as either a part of a shadow economy or a
different manifestation of it. In fact, in a case like Myanmar, it is difficult to tell them
apart inasmuch as they have become intertwined during the last decades. Henceforth,
the term 'war economy' will be understood as an integral part of the shadow economy
that specifically deals with the illegal  proliferation and provision of arms and other
military  supply  and  the  production  and  vending  of  drugs  as  well  as  the  taxation
mechanisms used to sustain military actors. It is the part of the economy that sustains
and prolongs war by enabling
“combatants and war entrepreneurs to avoid the pressures for settlements
that might otherwise arise from the exhaustion of highly localized resources,
including manpower.” (Ibid.: 3)
Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005: 2) have compiled a list of distinctive features of war
economies. According to them, war economies are characterized by the destruction or
circumvention  of  the  formal  (legal)  economy,  the  usage  of  violent  means  such  as
pillage,  predation,  extortion  and use  of  violence  against  civilians  for  economic  and
power political ends. They are, furthermore, highly decentralized and privatized. War
economies are linked to thriving cross-border trade, regional kinship and ethnicity, arms
trafficking and mercenaries. As all of these features can, arguably, also be attributed to
shadow economies, this thesis will continue for the most part to use the terms 'shadow
economy' and 'black markets' to describe the activities of actors while the term 'war
economy' will be occasionally used when deemed necessary.
 In order to understand the Myanmar civil war and why it has outlasted most
other civil wars that began at the same time, it is necessary to address shadow economic
activities. Its extraordinary length and its complex conflict dynamics are, among other
factors, the result of wide-ranging and vibrant economic activities outside the formal
economy that have given birth to a fully-fledged and all-pervasive war economy. An
essential part of the analysis chapter of this thesis is therefore to highlight its importance
for both the civil war itself and the opportunities it offers for potential spoilers. The
shadow economy is therefore crucial for the structural aspects of the spoiler concept.
Countries  plagued by violent  conflict  typically develop much bigger  shadow
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economies  than  for  example  most  European  industrial  countries.  This  is  not  only
because the conflict keeps the country in a permanent state of instability and unrest but
also because it opens up business opportunities that were not lucrative because of lack
of  demand.  The  demands  can  range  from  simple  consumer  goods  that  cannot  be
imported to arms that conflict parties need to fight their wars. In fact, since the 1990s
researchers have increasingly acknowledged that armed conflicts can create new forms
of profit and power and that an abundance of resources may let armed groups mutate
into criminal organizations devoid of any political aspirations (Melvin & de Koning
2011: 43; 46). 
Shadow economic activities extend beyond national borders and are thus never
confined only to a single state. The shadow economy of a state has at least regional
linkages. Potentially it reaches even further, well beyond the actual war zone and it may
go  as  far  as  linking  the  it  to  the  world's  commodity  markets  and  financial  centers
(Ballentine  &  Nitzschke  2005:  2).  Any analysis  of  or  intervention  against  shadow
economic activity must therefore take a regional or international perspective if it seeks
to understand how the shadow economy functions and influences violent conflict. Pugh
and Cooper  (2004:  3;  25-30)  posit  that  this  is  the  major  flaw in most  international
interventions against shadow and war economies: the narrow focus on a single country
fails to capture the full scope of smuggling activities, the revolving door behavior of
mercenaries, the importance of security in marginalized borderlands and how spoilers
often use the regional networks to utilize neglected resources.
Marginalized  and  impoverished  borderlands  with  porous  borders  form  an
integral part of exuberant and all-pervasive shadow economic activity because they are
in many cases not under the control of any form of state government. They constitute an
incubator,  or “neuralgia spots” as Pugh and Cooper call  them, for warlordism, gang
violence and the smuggling of various goods (especially arms and drugs), all regionally
connected via cross-border trade (Ibid.: 37). The same line of thought can be found in
Richard Auty's (2004: 29) writing in which he posits that it is porous national borders
that  feed  civil  strife  and  violence.  This  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  abuse  of
impoverished populations at the hands of warlords, gangs, militias and other actors who,
in the vacuum of the absence of any stable societal structure, create their own rules and
norms and enforce a violent scheme on the populations in the territories they control.
Without  unstable  borderlands,  widespread  and  all-pervasive  shadow  economic
structures could not exist. They provide the structural circumstances, that is to say a
17
political  and  administrative  vacuum,  without  which  neither  the  supply  for  war
economies  nor  the  wide-ranging  drug  production  and  vending  would  be  able  to
function. Naturally, peripheries and borderlands are often of great importance in civil
wars  inasmuch  as  insurgents  (or  other  actors)  use  them  as  areas  for  retreat  and
organizing  themselves,  frequently  cutting  them  off  from  government  control  and
creating what rebels often call “liberated zones.” Within these areas the aforementioned
violent  schemes emerge in the absence of legal  authority and give rise to extensive
shadow economic activities and markets of violence, in which violence is a defining
factor that shapes human co-existence (Kramer et al. 2014: 37).
However, shadow economies and their black markets are more than just illegal
activities  fostering  violence,  poverty  and  civil  war.  A major  and  often  neglected
characteristic, which undoubtedly explains its world-wide prevalence and allure, is the
welfare structures they provide. The usual characterization of shadow economies falls
short of understanding the most simple, yet important factor that lure many individuals
into participating: survival. Shadow economies, in fact, create employment and provide
people with jobs the legal economy cannot provide them with. Despite the perception in
the West that participation in shadow economies is irrational, it is in reality often the
only  way  that  poverty-stricken  people  especially  in  marginalized  borderlands  can
provide for themselves and their families, a fact echoed in the recent report of UNODC
on the drug production in Lao PDR and Myanmar (UNODC SEA Opium Survey 2014:
17).  The average  person therefore  can  profit  from shadow economies,  although the
largest share of the profits is accumulated by those who control the black markets (Pugh
& Cooper 2004: 6f.), for example regional business tycoons and warlords. That shadow
economies are an ambivalent phenomenon with the potential to fuel conflict and provide
livelihoods is  also echoed in recent  research (Melvin & de Koning 2011:  49).  It  is
crucial  to  understand  this  because  too  often  have  international  interventions  treated
shadow economic activities as a negative spin-off or deviation of legal economies, not
least because the development aid and cooperation nexus is almost solely in the hands
of Western countries for whom shadow economic activities of a larger scale are an alien
phenomenon.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  a  large portion of  those working within  the
shadow economy are not driven by greed and desire to do business but by poverty and
the desire to sustain themselves and their families. Poverty is intrinsically connected to
any shadow economic activity, especially in the case of Myanmar (Kramer et al. 2014:
7).
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Shadow economies cannot be destroyed, they must be transformed into a legal
economy (Pugh & Cooper 2004: 3f). While this may include co-opting those who made
their  fortune  through  criminal  activities,  it  also  includes  the  transformation  of,  for
example,  poppy  or  coca  cultivation  into  the  cultivation  of  other  cash  crops.  The
transformation is only possible if the local level of the economy is considered. However,
the local economy is a factor that contemporary peace-building strategies, which focus
on macroeconomic aspects, often neglect (Ibid.: 11).
In order to understand how civil wars can be sustained for longer periods of time
and  how  some  actors  acquire  the  resources  to  become  effective  spoilers  of  peace
processes,  shadow  economic  activities  along  with  their  transnational  characteristics
have to be taken into account. This holds especially true for the case of Myanmar where
the shadow economy has been utilized by virtually each and every actor involved in the
conflict, including the government itself. The subsequent chapters will address all these
issues together to answer the research question of the thesis. The following subchapter
introduces the theoretical concept used in this thesis, the concept of spoilers in peace
processes.
3.3. The Spoiler Concept
A common characteristic of peace processes is that they are complex and multifaceted
and include a considerable amount of stakeholders. A variety of obstacles can prevent
conflict from being resolved peacefully, one of them is the deliberate sabotage of peace
making efforts. Actors, which can be both individuals or organizations like militias, who
undermine or at least attempt to undermine a peace process are called spoilers.
The acknowledgment of spoilers as a major obstacle to peace in both academic
research and policy making is a phenomenon of the last 20 years.  In 1997, Stephen
Stedman  was  the  first  to  present  a  comprehensive  framework  for  the  analysis  and
handling of spoilers in peace processes. He did so in his article  Spoiler Problems in
Peace  Processes in  the  International  Security journal.  Stedman  defined  spoilers  as
actors who perceive peace as the result of negotiations as detrimental to their power,
worldview, and interests and therefore engage in violent spoiling behavior to undermine
the  attempts  of  making  peace  (Stedman  1997:  5). The  article  is  written  from  the
perspective of external actors acting as facilitators and overseeing the implementation of
peace agreements, these actors are labeled custodians of peace processes (Ibid.: 12). A
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consequence  of  Stedman's  article  was  a  vivid  debate  on  spoilers  among  academics
which has resulted in plenty of other publications dealing with the undoubtedly evident
and  problematic  phenomenon  of  spoilers  in  peace  processes.  This  debate  is  still
continuing.
Stedman's original concept has been subjected to both criticism and acclaim and
various scholars have taken up the idea while developing it further. The spoiler concept
has flourished since, and bifurcated into a variety of concepts that all have their roots in
Stedman's  article  from  1997.  The  alternative  and  advanced  concepts  that  have
succeeded the original one added new perspectives, new actors and other aspects which
are important to consider in the academic approaches to spoilers in peace processes.
The three most  relevant  pieces  of literature for this  thesis  include Stedman's
original,  Kelly  Greenhill  and  Solomon  Major's  The  Perils  of  Profiling  Civil  War
Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords (2006/2007) and Desirée Nilsson
and Mimmi Söderberg Kovac's Revisiting an Elusive Concept: A Review of the Debate
on  Spoilers  in  Peace  Processes  (2011).  These  articles  were  chosen  because  they
constitute  a  classic  dialectic  of  thesis,  antithesis  and  synthesis,  a  process  that  is
elaborated on further below.
Greenhill  and  Major  have  criticized  Stedman's  concept  as  being  too  actor-
centered and proclaimed that the structures and the environment in which stakeholders
act  are  of  higher  importance.  They  consider  the  relative  power  balance  between
stakeholders  and  the  opportunity  structures  to  be  more  crucial  than  the  actors
themselves. They call their spoiler concept a capabilities-based model.
In a response to their article, Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs criticize Greenhill
and Major for putting too much emphasis on structures. They propose a middle way
between them and Stedman. An adequate concept should pay attention to both actors
and structures in order to create a comprehensive lens through which conflicts, peace
processes and spoilers of peace processes can be seen.
The three articles constitute the key elements to the spoiler concept used in this
thesis, augmented by contributions of additional authors that are considered relevant for
an adequate concept of spoilers.
The following sections of this chapter will introduce the reader to the different
spoiler concepts of Stedman, Greenhill and Major and Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs in
more detail. The articles should be seen as an almost evolutionary step-by-step process
leading up to the theoretical framework of this thesis.
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3.3.1. Stedman: The Inception of a Concept (1997)
When Stedman published his article  Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes in 1997, he
paved the way for the academic assessment of an evident phenomenon: actors which
sabotage the peaceful resolution of conflicts or at least attempt to do so. According to
him, it is relevant to ask  who rather than  what constitutes a threat to peace (Stedman
1997: 53). The motivation for spoiling behavior derives from the spoiler's perception
that  peace  is  detrimental  to  the  own  power,  worldview  or  interests.  The  spoiler,
therefore, attempts to prevent peace from materializing by using violent means which
results in a perpetuation of conflict. This definition implies that a spoiler only exists in
relation to a peace process. It lies in the nature of a peace process to create spoilers
because without a peace process, there is nothing to spoil (Ibid.: 5; 7). The notion of the
nature of peace processes and spoilers resonates with the aforementioned observations
that  have  preceded  and  influenced  the  selection  process  of  a  thesis  topic.  Indeed,
Stedman pinpoints it succinctly when he posits that
“it  is  rare  in  civil  wars  for  all  leaders  and  factions  to  see  peace  as
beneficial.  Even  if  all  parties  come  to  value  peace,  they  rarely  do  so
simultaneously,  and  they  often  strongly  disagree  over  the  terms  of  an
acceptable peace.” 
He continues:
“A negotiated  peace  often  has  losers:  leaders  and  factions  who  do  not
achieve their war aims. Nor can every war find a compromise solution that
addresses the demands of all the warring parties” (Ibid.: 7). 
These observations  of  integral  parts  of  peace processes highlights how much fertile
ground and reasons exist for spoiling behavior.5
Stedman proceeds further  into the phenomenon and posits  that  custodians of
peace  face  several  problematic  issues  about  spoilers.  These  issues  differ  across  the
dimensions of  position in the peace process, the  number of spoiler,  the  locus  of the
spoiler problem and the type of spoiler.
The position describes whether a spoiler takes part in the formal peace process
or if it is excluded from participating. This is important because it demonstrates on the
one hand the problematic question of who should be included in the process (a decision
5 A major part of Stedman's article is a discussion of five different peace processes to which he applies his
spoiler concept, highlighting cases which support these claims. They will not be discussed in this thesis.
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that has to be made by the custodians and other stakeholders in the peace process) and
on the other hand that spoiling behavior might be an expression of a desire to become
part of the process. It is therefore important that the custodians are aware of the inside-
outside divide and the possible consequences of leaving an actor outside the process.
The number of spoilers is a simple, yet important issue. As it is possible that
more than one actor seeks to compromise a peace process, the custodians of the process
must understand that these spoilers have a relationship as well and that measures taken
to react to the spoiling behavior of one actor are likely to influence the behavior of
another. The higher the number of spoilers or potential spoilers, the more complex the
peace process becomes.
The locus of the spoiler problem is, in contrast to the numbers, a more complex
issue. While the position is concerned with the relationship between an actor and the
peace process, the locus describes the location of spoiling behavior within a spoiler, for
instance if the spoiling behavior either emanates from the leadership of an organization
or from its followers (or both). This factor implies that the origin of spoiling behavior
may have several loci and that the reasons behind it are far more complex than they may
seem  at  first  glance.  In  order  to  sustain  a  peace  process  and  to  mitigate  spoiling
behavior, it is necessary to learn about the internal structures of the actors inside and
outside the process and who and what influences their actions. A narrow focus only on
the leadership of a militia might conceal that the actual locus of the spoiler problem is
the rank and file, or vice versa (Ibid.: 8f.).
The remaining issue is the type of spoiler. In Stedman's list, the type comes third
before locus, here it is discussed last because it is arguably the most controversial item
on his list and a major part of the critique leveled at Stedman's concept concerns his
typology of spoilers. According to Stedman, a spoiler can be either a limited, a greedy or
a total spoiler. These categories are fix and the spoiler type usually does not change. The
type depends on the goals the spoiler is  pursuing and the type,  in  turn,  defines  the
appropriate measures to react to spoiling behavior. A limited spoiler has only limited
goals, for example political recognition, a share of power or, as mentioned earlier, to
become a part of the peace process if it is located outside the formal process. A greedy
spoiler's goals are subject to a cost and risk analysis and the demands shrink and expand
depending on how favorable a spoiler perceives the circumstances and its own position
in relation to other actors. Total spoilers constitute the most problematic type. They see
the world in all-or-nothing terms, they pursue total power, refuse to compromise and
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lack a sense for pragmatism. The goals and demands of total spoilers do not change and
they are therefore the most difficult to handle and the most perilous to a peace process
(Ibid.: 10f.).
The approaches to handle spoilers are manifold and depend on the spoiler type,
which is why a precise analysis of the spoiler type is highly important. The strategies
applied  must  match  the  spoiler  type.  (Ibid.:  14).  A wrong  measure  may  turn  out
ineffective and not  altering a  spoiler's  behavior  at  all  but it  may also exacerbate  it.
Stedman suggests three major strategies custodians can adopt when the peace process is
threatened by spoilers: Inducement, Socialization, and Coercion. 
Inducement is a strategy which gives in to a spoiler's demands and thus gives it
what  it  asks  for.  The strategy assumes  that  spoiling  behavior  can  be  terminated  by
removing motivations to  spoil.  It  can take the form of  something concrete,  such as
guaranteeing a share of power, or something lax, such as promising a continued role in
negotiations.  Inducement  works  best  against  limited  spoilers  who spoil  for  specific
reasons and who have concrete demands. Greedy spoilers can be brought into the peace
process in the same way but it is far more risky to induce them because any form of
inducement  might  feed  their  greed  for  more  (Ibid.:  12ff.).  Total  spoilers  cannot  be
accommodated and inducement is therefore futile (Ibid. 14.).
Socialization refers to a process started by custodians that alters spoiler behavior
by  establishing  a  set  of  norms  for  acceptable  behavior.  These  norms  are  then  the
framework for the peace process and the behavior and any demands by actors will be
judged against the backdrop of these norms. Spoilers are then exposed to both material
and  intellectual  components  of  the  strategy,  the  first  being  a  careful  application  of
punishment and reward and the latter being regular attempts of persuading the spoiler of
the value of the set of norms (Ibid.: 13). Socialization works well on limited spoilers
and it  is  entirely useless against  total  spoilers.  A greedy spoiler  demands long-term
socialization efforts to bring it into the peace process in combination with inducement
and coercive measures.
Coercion is  the most  aggressive strategy which employs the use or threat of
punishment of actors for their spoiling behavior. The different forms of coercion include
the  use  or  threat  of  military  force  to  bring  a  spoiler  to  its  knees  to  take  away its
capacities to spoil, to threaten to withdraw entirely from the process, to use coercive
diplomacy or to use the  departing train strategy. Stedman claims that coercion is the
only strategy that works against total spoilers. The departing train is a metaphor for a
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coercive strategy that signals the total spoiler that the peace process will go forward
regardless if it comes on board or not and it is up to the spoiler whether it will be part of
any future agreement.  Withdrawal  is  based on the assumption that  a  spoiler  desires
international presence and that withdrawing it will make it give in. Limited and greedy
spoilers can be brought into the process by coercion as well but the strategy is risky in
any case because it might exacerbate the conflict. Coercive measures should be applied
with utmost care and avoided if they are not deemed necessary (Ibid.: 13-16). Limited
and  greedy  spoilers  are  more  likely  to  be  accommodated  through  inducement  and
socialization.
Stedman  readily  acknowledges  that  he  describes  only  simplified  versions  of
possible strategies and the forms they may take in practice, a hint that the concept he
lays  out  in  the  paper  is  merely  in  its  infant  stages  (Ibid.:  12).  It  is,  however,
comprehensive and logical and offers a suitable basis for further development. Major
criticism is mainly leveled at his spoiler typology and the strong focus he puts on actors
while  neglecting  almost  entirely  the  social,  political  and  economic  environment  in
which stakeholders act. The strong emphasis he puts on actors represents in a way an
extreme end of a spectrum of explanatory factors which will be looked at below. The
following subchapter wills  shed more light on the criticism that other scholars have
directed at Stedman, but before that a few more remarks are necessary on Stedman and
his concept with regard to this thesis.
While  the  concept  which  he  lays  out  in  his  article  is  undoubtedly  a  major
contribution to the understanding of peace processes, the obstacles they may face and
the reasons they may fail, the concept in its original shape is not usable for this thesis.
Firstly, this is because the spoiler types he lays out are too inflexible for a long-lasting
and  multifaceted  conflict  as  the  civil  war  in  Myanmar.  The  violent  conflict  in  the
country has  changed  its  course  so  many times  and  actors  have  come and  gone.  A
concept  that  is  appropriate  for  this  conflict  needs  to  be  more  flexible.  Secondly,
Stedman's  model  cannot  be  used  because  the  social,  political,  and  economic
environment is of fundamental importance to understand the conflict in Myanmar and is
intrinsically  connected  to  questions  of  poverty  and  socioeconomic  dislocation.  A
concept that pays no attention to the environment in which people are living and in
which stakeholders act is not suited for a comprehensive conflict analysis. And lastly,
Stedman's model looks only at those actors which have already attempted to sabotage a
peace process and which are therefore visible, manifest spoilers. Potential spoilers have
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no place in his model. A model to analyze the civil war in Myanmar needs to include
potential spoilers, possibly even more than it needs to consider manifest ones, since so
far no obvious spoilers from the drug business have appeared. However, since the peace
talks are ongoing and the situation remains unstable,  it  is  highly important to use a
model  that  looks  at  stakeholders  that  might  become  spoilers  throughout  the  peace
process. Hence other versions of the spoiler concept are discussed below to make up for
the shortcomings of Stedman's model. It is, however, necessary to review Stedman's
original concept in much detail because all the following issues are built on it and the
steps of evolution would remain unclear if no adequate attention would be paid to where
the concept originated from.
3.3.2. Greenhill and Major: The other End of the Spectrum (2006/2007)
Kelly Greenhill  and Solomon Major are  advocates  of a  spoiler  concept  that  can be
located at the other end of an actor-structure spectrum. They refer to their own model as
a capabilities-based model as opposed to the spoiler model of Stedman. The authors
posit that Stedman's model focuses too much on actors while it neglects  opportunity
structures which influence how stakeholders act in peace processes. For them, the way
stakeholders behave and whether they resort to spoiling behavior depends for the most
part on the social, political, military and economic environment and their own relative
position in the power structures vis-à-vis other stakeholders. Or, in their words: “Spoiler
behavior is thus, we posit, more closely causally linked to strategic exigencies than to
individual motivations” (Greenhill and Major 2006/2007: 12). They do acknowledge in
their preface that individuals play an important role in peacemaking but ultimately, their
model largely ignores them (Ibid.: 8).
Greenhill  and Major  perceive  Stedman's  model  as  upside  down and seek  to
rectify it: not the spoiler type defines the possible outcomes of a peace process but,
conversely, the outcomes that are possible define how stakeholders behave and if they
engage in spoiling behavior (Ibid.:  8).  Stakeholders are motivated by distribution of
power and they therefore adjust their goals (but not their preferences) according to their
own position in the current relative power structures. (Ibid.: 9). Their position in the
power structures shifts along with their  goals and how far they go to achieve them,
always according to where they perceive themselves in relation to other stakeholders.
Grenhill and Major therefore posit that whether or not an actors becomes a spoiler is a
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question of self-perception: 
“Rightly  or  wrongly,  if  combatants  believe  they  have  the  capacity  to
unilaterally achieve a better deal than the one on the table, they are likely to
resort to spoiling behavior” (Ibid.: 12).
Their model recognizes two important factors which Stedman's model is not taking into
account: Firstly, it considers flexibility and unexpected changes in power structures. An
actor that used to be powerful enough to bring down the peace process might be reduced
to a minor player during the process while a formerly weak actor can potentially be
empowered to become a successful spoiler. Secondly, and as a consequence of the first
factor, it allows the inclusion of potential spoilers.
The missing variable of potential spoilers is a major point of critique leveled at
Stedman. Greenhill and Major emphasize how problematic it is to pay attention only to
already  established  and  widely  recognized  individuals  or  groups  because  this
perspective neglects all those weak actors that would oppose the implementation of a
peace accord if they would be capable of doing so (Ibid.: 10).
The bottom line  is  therefore  that  Stedman's  typology of  spoilers  is  not  only
inflexible but also inadequate because in a sense every spoiler is a greedy spoiler who
makes decisions based on a cost and risk analysis, always according to the own position
in the power structures, sometimes demanding more, sometimes less, and sometimes
even the impossible (demands of a total spoiler). This means that spoiler type cannot be
a fix category, it is in flux and subjected to change. Pressing an actor into a fix category
is futile since its behavior might change any time. Ultimately, every actor will be as
greedy as it believes it can afford to be based on the current power balance, (military)
capabilities, resources and other environmental factors (Ibid.: 22).
As an example of how the behavior of an actor changes, Greenhill and Major
refer to the cases Stedman used himself to explain and illustrate his model: Angola and
Cambodia.
 To disprove the importance of individuals, the authors pick the political leading
figure  Jonas  Malheiro  Savimbi,  in  his  days  leader  of  the  União  Nacional  para  a
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). According to Greenhill and Major,
“Savimbi's switch from a nonspoiler prior to Angolan independence (late
1960s, early 1970s),  to greedy spoiler (1991),  to total spoiler (1992),  to
limited  spoiler  (1994),  and  back  to  total  spoiler  (post-Lusaka)  reflected
changes in the distribution of power and demonstrates that spoiler type is
dependent  on  the  situation  on  the  ground  rather  than  the  other  way
around.” (Ibid.: 23).
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In the Cambodian case, they posit that Hun Sen and his personality were of much less
importance than the structural environment in which he and his Cambodian People's
Party (CPP) operated: 
“In short, the SOC/CPP transmuted from a nonspoiler to a greedy spoiler to
a  total  spoiler,  shifting  its  position  based  on changes  in  the  balance  of
power and the prevailing opportunity structure,  not on any of Hun Sen's
fundamental character traits.” (Ibid.: 36).
They sum up their major critique leveled at Stedman by saying: 
“By maintaining that spoiler type determines success or failure in the peace
process, the spoiler model treats spoiler type as the independent variable”
and “the distinction between limited, greedy, and total spoilers is situation
dependent and not actor dependent” (Ibid.: 36).
The authors have made clear that they in principal support the idea that spoilers
exist but they disagree how to classify them and that a certain type predicts possible
outcomes of a peace process. They made valuable contribution to the understanding of
spoilers and why they emerge but their model is not without flaws, either. 
Greenhill  and Major overemphasize the importance of structures.  While  it  is
clearly necessary to pay attention to the structures in which stakeholders operate, their
strong contradiction to Stedman's actor-centered approach makes them neglect the role
individuals play both in peace processes and in steering decisions of organizations and
institutions. Although they initially posit that individuals play a significant role, their
model ultimately does not include them. The structure-centered approach removes any
agency from actors and renders them mere slaves to their surroundings, making it a
valuable contribution but not a suitable model for an analysis of the Myanmar conflict.
They go too far to the other end of the actor-structure spectrum and miss the chance to
find a middle ground between the two poles.
The next article reviews the different models of the spoiler concept and tries to
create  a  model  including  the  poles  of  both  ends  of  the  spectrum  which  is  more
applicable and inclusive.
3.3.3. Desirée Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs: A Middle Ground (2011)
In 2011, Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs reviewed the different versions of the spoiler
concept that have emerged since Stedman's original in 1997. Against the backdrop of
the variety of models, the authors propose a middle ground between an actor- and a
structure-centered approach. They argue that both factors should be included to create
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an  applicable  and  comprehensive  model  since  both  actors  and  the  structural
environment of a peace process are likely to explain the emergence of spoilers (Nilsson
and Söderberg Kovacs 2011: 614). The article constitutes therefore the third step in the
evolution of the spoiler concept inasmuch as it tries to bring a variety of strands together
into a single model: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. A classic dialectic.
Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs highlight several aspects of the spoiler concept
that need to be taken into account before using it. The first is that the concept has clear
powerful  normative  underpinnings.  In  fact,  some  authors  suggest  that  the  concept
derives and gains its meaning only in relation to the core of the liberal peace building
paradigm. This means that, 
“consequently,  actors  that  behave  according  to  the  expectations  of  this
normative  framework  will  be  considered  to  raise  fair  and  legitimate
demands,  whereas  those  that  disagree  will  per  definition  be  viewed  as
spoilers, which in turn determines how the key peace custodians respond to
various actors in the peace process” (Ibid.: 609).
In  addition  to  that,  Newman  and  Richmond  remark  that  what  constitutes  spoiling
behavior  depends on  the  perception of  demands.  This  means that  subjectivity is  an
integral part of spoiling (Newman and Richmond 2006a: 103). One party's demand may
seem perfectly rational and justified to one side while another party's perceives it simply
as spoiling by raising unreasonable demands. It is important to have this in mind but as
of now, a spoiler concept that is not depending on the liberal peace building paradigm
has not been suggested.  This limitation is however not preventing the concept from
being used in this thesis, as it is believed that it holds still merit for an analysis of the
civil  war  and  peace  process  in  Myanmar.  The  consequences  of  this  normative
foundation is discussed towards the end of this thesis.
The authors furthermore point out that in order to use the concept, the user has to
clarify a number of issues so that the concept is not becoming unusable. Firstly, the user
has to answer the question of what the variable under scrutiny is. Is it the motivation for
spoiling? Or the consequences of spoiling behavior on the outcomes of a peace process?
(Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011: 608; 612). Secondly, it is necessary to have an
operational  definition  of  spoilers,  and thirdly,  the  model  has  to  be  clear  whether  it
includes only manifest or latent spoilers or both (Ibid.: 610).
The article conflates arguments from other authors to build their own theoretical
model.  One  major  contribution  comes  from  Marie-Joëlle Zahar  and  her  article
Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes (2008). She posits that the use of
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violence is only one of several means that stakeholders can use to spoil a peace process,
in  fact,  the  typical  spoiler  rather  systematically  refuses  to  negotiate  or  resorts  to
promises which it does not intend to keep (Ibid.: 611). In the articles discussed earlier,
spoiling was implicitly equated with violence. Furthermore, they highlight Newman and
Richmond's  (2006a)  observation  that  indeed,  the  destruction  of  a  peace  process  is
merely one possible motivation for a spoiler. Spoiling may also be used to shape a peace
process in their favor and to pressure the other actors involved. They readily admit that
spoiling may also have productive result, for example the inclusion of new actors and
their  interests,  the  recognition  of  new  actors  and  potentially  concessions  and
compromise (Newman and Richmond 2006b: 6). A possible goal can for example be the
aforementioned desire to become part of the peace process if the actor is currently not
sitting at the negotiation table. This partly positively connoted side of spoiling behavior
may not only be counter-intuitive to what most people would probably assume, it is
furthermore an expression of the fact that the possible outcomes of a peace process are
not limited to the dichotomy of successful versus failed peace process. On the contrary,
a  peace  process  is  a  complex,  multifaceted  process  involving a  variety of  different
actors, interests and goals. Reducing the possible outcomes to a two-sided coin fails to
encompass and comprehend the complexity of both the conflict  itself  as well  as its
underlying dynamics.
Besides the different forms that spoiling behavior can take, another important
question is who the addressee of spoiling behavior is. The other two models have at
least  implicitly  assumed  that  acts  of  spoiling  are  primarily  addressed  to  other
stakeholders  or  the  custodians  of  peace  processes.  Nilsson  and  Söderberg  Kovacs,
however, bring in an argument by Wendy Pearlman (2009) who, based on studies of
Palestinian politics, posits that the targets of spoiling (or peacemaking, for that matter)
are not necessarily limited to those actors at the other side of a negotiation table but that
the target might also be their internal constituencies. (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs
2011: 618). This resonates with Stedman's notion of locus, although he himself did not
take  this  specific  aspect  into  consideration.  In  some  peace  processes  it  might  be
therefore relevant to assume that the motivation for spoiling behavior is not only to gain
something from other stakeholders involved but also to demonstrate the own followers
for example strength, goodwill, readiness to compromise or readiness to sabotage.
Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs' review of the different models then takes a turn
and comments on the shortcomings of the structural model as it was conceptualized by
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Greenhill and Major. They criticize a too heavy focus on structures and remark that the
model  is  oversimplifying  the  range  of  strategic  considerations  that  actors  take  into
account  beyond the resources  they have and beyond the risks  and costs  of  spoiling
behavior. Furthermore, Greenhill and Major neglect an important argument by Stedman
which is that spoilers do not only resort to spoiling because the situation allows it but
also because they  want to spoil.  (Ibid.:  613).  The structural model therefore fails  to
explain  spoiler  behavior  in  cases  where  potent  and  resourceful  spoilers  signed  and
honored peace agreements, even though the structures and the relative power balance
would have potentially allowed them to gain more by spoiling than by making peace:
The authors conclude their critique by stating: 
“Hence, like some other writers in the field, we too believe that both the
character of the group itself and the structural environment of the peace
process are likely to be of importance for the emergence of spoilers.” (Ibid.:
617).
Ultimately,  a  proper  spoiler  concept  should  be  oriented  along  the  lines  of
manifest vs. latent spoilers, violent vs. non-violent means, analysis of spoiler actions vs.
analysis of outcomes and spoiler prevention vs. spoiler management (Ibid.: 623f.). The
concept that is laid out in the following subchapter will make use of this advice. Nilsson
and Söderberg  Kovacs  provide a  useful  overview of  the  variety of  different  spoiler
concepts  and  contributions  that  other  researchers  have  made  to  the  concept.  Their
nuanced criticism aimed at especially Greenhill and Major shows that their structural
concept suffers from certain shortcomings but does not discard the model entirely. A
middle  way between  Stedman's  actor-centered  and  Greenhill  and  Major's  structure-
centered  approach  is  more  likely  to  form a  comprehensive  analytic  model  through
which spoilers can be understood. The model constructed for this thesis should therefore
include a lens for the actors in the peace process and civil war in Myanmar, their history
and  the  involved  personalities  but  it  should  also  consider  the  structures  and  the
environment in which these actors are operating.
3.3.4. The Concept used in this Thesis
At this point it might be useful to remember that the purpose of the thesis is to find out
whether there are actors in Myanmar which are involved in the drug business that have
an interest  in prolonging the civil  war for power political  and economic reasons.  In
accordance with Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs advice, it should be made clear that the
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research interest is primarily to explain spoiler actions and why they occur (Ibid.: 612)
and not what the possible outcomes of these actions are. The goal is to conclude in the
end whether spoilers, or latent spoilers, are a relevant obstacle to Myanmar's nationwide
ceasefire process and to highlight how closely interlinked the drug business is with both
poverty in the periphery and violence against other armed groups and the civilians who
cultivate and farm the poppy. The following will be the working definition of spoilers,
condensed from the different pieces of literature: 
Spoilers  are actors  which  perceive  a nationwide  ceasefire  agreement  as
being  detrimental  to  their  power,  economic  activities  or  worldview  and
therefore seek to either undermine it or try to shape it in their favor by using
a variety of means, of which one can be violence. A spoiler's behavior is
influenced  both  by  individual  decision-making  and  the  structural
environment in which it is operating.
What concept, then, would be suitable to answer the research question of this
thesis? And what properties are necessary to make it applicable to a complex and long-
lasting conflict such as the Myanmar civil war? A concept for this purpose needs to have
the  following characteristics:  it  must  include  both  actors  and structures,  it  must  be
flexible  and reject  rigid categories,  it  must  have  space for  both  manifest  and latent
spoiler. The spoiler category should be oriented along the lines of three of Stedman's
four issues in peace processes: position, numbers, and locus but not spoiler type.6. It
focuses on spoiler analysis and spoiler prevention. The concept must also acknowledge
that spoiling behavior is a subjective description for behavior perceived as detrimental
to peace. Why are these characteristics necessary?
The complexity of the Myanmar civil war, its long duration, the myriad amount
of  actors  and the  fluctuating  political,  social,  religious  and economic  circumstances
require that the concept includes a component for actors and one for structures. The
conflict  has  been  shaped  undoubtedly  by  actors  such  as  the  Tatmadaw,  various
insurgency groups, warlords and gangs and militias. While the argument that they all
adjust their behavior to where they perceive themselves in the relative power balance
vis-à-vis the other actors is hard to refute, the behavior of an actor also depends on
decisions made by its leadership or the rank and file. These decisions may not be made
based  on  risk  and  cost  analyses  and  they  may contradict  any apparent  logical  and
6 It is necessary to mention that the concept used in this thesis is not crafted from the perspective of 
custodians of peace as is the concept of Stedman and others. This is because there are no custodians of
peace in the Myanmar peace process. The talks are held between the government and the insurgent 
groups without an external mediator or negotiator. Only facilitation is provided e.g. through the 
'Myanmar Peace Support Initiative' of the Norwegian government.
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rational  behavior.  Decisions  are  made  by  human  beings  and  human  beings  make
irrational  decisions.  Or,  as  Nilsson  and  Söderberg  Kovacs  have  condensed  from
Stedman's article, spoilers resort to spoiling behavior because they  want to, not only
because they have the opportunity to do so (Ibid.: 613). The concept can therefore reject
neither  the importance of actors  nor  how opportunity structures  shape behavior  and
therefore spoiling behavior (or whether or not an actor resorts to spoiling).
Rigid  spoiler  categories  are  unsuitable  for  this  conflict  because  they  do  not
reflect its complexity and the variability of power relations and actor constellations. If
structures,  which  influence  the  behavior  of  an  actor,  are  part  of  the  analysis,  rigid
categories  are  an  impossibility.  The  actors  in  the  Myanmar  conflict  cannot  be
understood in absolute, rigid terms, they cannot be put in a box with a label. They, in
fact,  demonstrate  how goals  and  demands,  as  well  as  means  to  achieve  them can,
change over  a  longer  period  of  time.  This  fact  cannot  be adequately described and
captured by fix categories as Stedman has proposed in his concept and hence spoiler
categories are not used in this thesis.
The spoiler concept must include both manifest and latent spoilers because both
the ceasefire talks and fighting between the Tatmadaw and various insurgent groups are
continuing while this thesis is written. Potentially, new spoilers might emerge at any
time and it is important, especially for the purpose of this thesis, to include those in an
analysis that might have not engaged in spoiling behavior so far but that might do so in
the future if the peace process reaches a certain point or if power balances or leadership
of actors change. The latent spoiler criteria therefore takes into account that there are
actors that are under the current circumstances not spoiling but, for whatever reason,
that  they  might  do  so  if  the  circumstances  change.  The  thesis  is  generally  more
concerned  with  latent  spoilers.  This  is  a  technical  decision  because  no  actor  with
connections to the drug business has engaged in spoiling behavior explicitly to protect
its business so far. It does not stem from a believe that manifest spoilers are of lesser
importance than latent ones; it is a matter of factuality.
Since latent spoilers are of more importance for this thesis, spoiler analysis and
spoiler prevention are of principal concern. However, spoiler management is not part of
the  framework  due  to  the  lack  of  manifest  spoilers  that  demand  management.  The
purpose of this thesis is to point out and analyze actors that might engage in spoiling
behavior because of their connections to the drug business and because they want to
preserve their business model and lifestyle. Attention must be paid therefore to who the
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actors are, which goals they pursue, and what measures can be taken to prevent them
from becoming spoilers.  Especially the last  question  coincides  with the question of
future policies that will have to address the poppy cultivation and the drug production,
which, in turn, are intrinsically connected to poverty and lack of agricultural alternatives
of the population in the peripheries of Myanmar. In addition, Newman and Richmond's
(2006a)  notion about  the different possible motives  of spoiling behavior  have to be
included. It  is possible that some of the actors involved may use spoiling only as a
means to shape the peace process, not to destroy it. Businesses can be maintained even
under conditions of peace if the ceasefire agreement is drafted in their favor. The thesis
is therefore not only looking at those actors who attempt to sabotage the peace process
altogether.
Position, number and locus must be included because all three of them matter
when looking at peace talks: who participates and who does not? How many actors are
there, how many of them are potential spoilers and what is their relationship? And from
where in the internal structure of an actor emanates the spoiling behavior? Even though
there are formally no custodians in the Myanmar peace process for which Stedman
formulated these issues, they may as well be used for academic analysis of the conflict
like in this Master's thesis.
The theoretical  framework for further  analysis  therefore will  be made of the
items laid out in the following. It is important to note that the most important period of
time to which the concept is applied is the one from 2011 until today. This is because
the government since 2011 is the most reformist government since decades and the one
that  has  shown  the  highest  interest  in  a  comprehensive  and  inclusive  ceasefire
agreement. The 2011-present time period and its peace process are therefore the period
under  scrutiny.  However,  in  order  to  understand  the  behavior  of  actors,  occasional
recourse is necessary until 1989, sometimes until independence in 1948.
The first  variable  is  the actor-variable.  It  will  include the main actors in  the
conflict and the ceasefire talks and will focus on the relationship they have, the history
they share and the behavior they have shown in the past years as well as the locus of
potential  spoiler  behavior.  The  second  variable  is  the  structural  environment  of  the
Myanmar civil war and deals with the factors which enable actors to spoil in the first
place: for example the fragmentation of rebel groups, the importance that opium had
and still has for both the insurgent groups and the successive military governments, the
pervasiveness of poverty, especially in the peripheries, and how poverty is intertwined
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with  the  drug  business.  These  two  variables  are  discussed  together  because  it  is
impossible to not recur to structures when talking about actors and vice-versa.
The concept will be applied after the following chapter has introduced the reader
to  the  complex  and  dynamic  political,  cultural,  societal  and  economic  situation  of
contemporary Myanmar, against the backdrop of its conflict-stricken history.7
4. Context: History, Conflict Dynamics and the Golden Triangle
The pursuit of looking for spoilers in the Myanmar case has to be done against the
backdrop of its recent history, the dynamics of the long-lasting civil war and the region
called 'the Golden Triangle' where a major portion of the world's opium is produced.8
The historical part covers the time from 1947 until today in which Myanmar, known as
'Burma' until 1989, became independent, experienced civil war and was ruled by several
civilian and military governments.
4.1. Contemporary Myanmar
Located at  the Southwestern tip  of Southeast Asia  and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), Myanmar is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in
the world and home to approximately 51 million people. Roughly two thirds belong to
the  majority  population  of  the  Bamar,  who,  for  the  most  part,  follow  Theravada
Buddhism.  The  other  third  is  composed  of  various  ethnic,  linguistic  and  religious
groups. The biggest minority groups are the Shan, Karen, Rakhine, Chin and Mon plus
significant  minorities  of  Chinese and Indians.  Other  religions  besides Buddhism are
Christianity, Islam and various animist religions. Contemporary Myanmar is the result
of colonialism inasmuch as many of the regions and ethnic groups that belong today to
the country have never been part of the kingdoms and realms of Burmese rulers before
the British arrival. This includes for example the Wa hills in the Northeast.
The government lists 135 official ethnic groups inhabiting Myanmar while some
scholars claim that 30 to 40 different groups is a more realistic number (Lintner 2007:
110). Myanmar borders Bangladesh to the West, India to the Northwest, China to the
7 Due to the length of the thesis, only a rough sketch is possible that includes the relevant information to
answer the research question.
8 The 2012 Word Drug Report by the UNODC concluded that around 20 percent of the global poppy 
cultivation is taking place in Myanmar and Lao PDR (with Myanmar having the much larger part) 
while Afghanistan hosts 63 percent (UNODC WDR 2012: 27).
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Northeast as well as Laos and Thailand to the East. The South and West form a roughly
1900 kilometer  long coastline along the Bay of Bengal  and the Andaman Sea.  The
Myanmar-Thailand-Laos triangular border region is  also called the Golden Triangle,
one of the world's major hubs for opium cultivation and heroin refining.
While it was considered one of the potentially most prosperous countries in Asia
after independence from the United Kingdom, decades of civil war and ethnic strife,
political  oppression by successive military governments  and their  economic  misrule
have turned the country into one of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) in the world
(Smith 2007: 2). After a short and turbulent period of democracy from 1948 to 1962, the
country has been ruled by several military governments. The incumbent government is
nominally civilian but comprised mostly of former generals that have taken off their
uniforms. After a failed attempt of the so-called “Burmese Way to Socialism” between
1962  and  1988  under  dictator  General  Ne  Win,  Ne  Win's  successors  have  slowly
introduced reforms to move towards a market-based economy, a process that has been
accelerated since 2011. The transformation is still ongoing in 2015.
The image of Myanmar in Europe and North America is a result of superficial
news coverage. The topics that are usually covered are limited to democracy icon Aung
San Suu Kyi, daughter of independence hero Aung San, her party National League for
Democracy (NLD) and her political struggle with the government and the Tatmadaw.
Suu Kyi became a magnet for media attention since she received the Peace Nobel Prize
in  1991  as  well  as  other  prizes  related  to  human  rights,  freedom  of  speech  and
democracy and her popularity has led not only to a skewed image of Myanmar but it
also diverts  attention from issues other than her and her political  agenda.  The most
pressing issue for the country is arguably the ethnic grievances between the Bamar and
the other ethnic groups in the country and the civil war as its direct result. Despite the
significance, the ethnic grievances make it rarely into the limited news coverage. Only
the outbreak of violence between the Buddhist Rakhine and the Muslim Rohingya in
Myanmar's Western Rakhine state (Arakan) in June 2012 has received limited attention
but  has  largely  disappeared  over  the  course  of  the  following  months.  Against  this
backdrop of limited news coverage and the focus on Aung San Suu Kyi,  the recent
changes  in  Myanmar  have  been misinterpreted  and misunderstood.  For  example  do
many newspapers in Europe claim that the changes in Myanmar began only in 2011 and
that  they came as a  surprise,  although hints  and small  steps  of  reform were visible
already in the 1990s. Even though the motives of the incumbent government remain
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opaque  and  despite  many  critical  issues  remain  unsolved,  some  improvements
politically and economically can be observed.
The  current  quasi-civilian  government  has  initiated  a  set  of  political  and
economic reforms that have sparked positive reactions especially in Europe and North
America and that have been described as coming as a surprise. The reforms included the
release of Aung San Suu Kyi as well as other political prisoners from house arrest and
prison.  Since by-elections  in  2012, Suu Kyi  holds  a  seat  in  the lower house of  the
Myanmar parliament (Pyithu Hluttaw) along with over 40 other members of the NLD.
The  strict  censorship  of  the  media  has  been  eased,  although  it  has  not  been  lifted
entirely.
The government has also embarked on a new series of ceasefire talks with the
various ethnic armed groups that are still fighting the government, aiming for a nation-
wide ceasefire. Despite the positive reaction by European and North American political
actors and observers, the motives behind the ceasefire talks remain ambiguous given the
military's history of utilizing bilateral ceasefires to prevent the formation of a united
front of the ethnic armed groups. Some observers argue that the ceasefires are motivated
by the desire to neutralize the military opposition so that the government can focus on
the civilian opposition with Aung San Suu Kyi  at  the helm (Fink 2001:  77).  Bertil
Lintner posited in e-mail correspondence that exactly these politics of divide and rule
are also behind the current ceasefire talks. The ceasefire process, the prime source of
interest of this thesis, has therefore to be handled with caution since the motivations
behind it remain blurry.
As a result of the reforms the EU and the USA have rolled back all economic
sanctions (only the arms embargo imposed remains in tact) imposed on the government
after it brutally quelled the '8888 Protests' (commencing on August 8 th, 1988). This is
not only motivated by opening up new markets with cheap labor but also by Myanmar's
major geopolitical importance: it plays a key role in the land-based part of the energy
security network of the People's Republic of China (China) through pipelines from the
Andaman Sea to the regional capital Kunming of China's landlocked Yunnan province9
and  it  is  a  means  of  exerting  influence  in  the  ASEAN.  Counterbalancing  China's
influence in Myanmar is therefore a relevant objective of both EU and USA.10
9 Myanmar is one of the countries that allows the circumvention of the Straits of Malacca by using 
pipelines and other means of land-based transportation of oil, gas and other natural resources.
10 Due to sanctions imposed by the EU and USA, China has been Myanmar's only major partner for 
decades and achieved a dominating position in both politics and economy.
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In  how  far  these  recent  reforms  and  the  ceasefire  talks  constitute  an
improvement,  especially  for  the  population  in  the  peripheries  that  remain  not  only
deeply  impoverished  but  also  constantly  exposed  to  warfare,  oppression,  predation
taxation, pillage and other expressions of violence, remains to be seen.
4.2. Recent History
The recent history of Myanmar is a history of violence and permanent upheaval. When
in 1947 independence hero Aung San (father of the Peace Nobel Laureate, activist and
politician Aung San Suu Kyi) negotiated the much hailed 'Panglong Agreement' with
some  of  the  ethnic  nationalities  in  the  small  town  of  Panglong,  the  future  looked
promising.  But  Aung  San's  assassination  in  1947,  the  failures  of  his  successors  to
accommodate the ethnic nationalities and the increasingly nationalistic, chauvinistic and
oppressive military governments have pushed the country into an abyss of violence,
poverty, discrimination and an accelerating spiral of warfare. A multitude of different
ethnic armed groups with political goals like the Karen National Union (KNU) and the
Kachin Independence Organization and Army (KIO and KIA),  the now defunct  but
formerly powerful and Beijing-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB), influential
warlords like Khun Sa, Lo Hsing Han, remnants of the defeated Kuomintang (KMT)
and a military absorbing at times almost 50 percent of the state budget, have turned
Myanmar into a battlefield and divided it into a carpet rug of small zones under control
of different actors and they have created plenty of small and detached societies in which
violence is not only a frequent phenomenon but rather a commodity and integral part of
everyday life. In a country with no external enemies, the Tatmadaw became the most
powerful political actor and one of the largest armies in the world.
The Tatmadaw is one of the least transparent actors in the conflict because it is
unclear  how  much  control  the  Thein  Sein  government  exerts  over  it  and  because
significant parts of their local commanders and their troops, especially those deployed
in the ethnic peripheries, are involved in the drug business and other businesses (Ghosh
2013-07-10;  Kramer  et  al.  2014:  35f.).  The  Tatmadaw  has  emerged  as  the  most
influential actor in the country with a closed ideology of fighting against dissolution of
the  Union  of  Myanmar  and  of  being  the  guarantee  of  a  prosperous  future.  It  is
furthermore guided by a form of Buddhist nationalism that understands Myanmar as a
Buddhist country, despite its ethnic and religious diversity. Especially after Ne Win's
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coup d'état in 1962 the successive governments have embarked on policies of nation-
building by creating an all-encompassing, homogeneous nation with the leitmotif “one
religion, one language, one ethnicity.”11 (Sakhong  2011: 4).  The consequence of this
mindset has been discrimination against ethnic nationalities based on their religion and
culture in the forms of policies of forced assimilation,  banning the teaching of their
respective languages and other means of undermining their culture. Intriguingly,  this
confrontation has not only amplified military resistance against the regime but it has
also  forged a  sense  of  commonality among ethnic  nationalities  that  had not  existed
before (Sakhong 2012: 4; 13 ). 
A more accurate description of the Myanmar civil war would be that has been
and in parts still is comprised of a myriad of mostly small- and medium-scale civil wars
between the military and a multitude of actors taking place in a mountainous jungle
environment favoring guerrilla warfare over open army versus army battles. In addition
come hostilities between ethnic armed groups as well as competition for influence and
control  of  business  and  drug  networks  between  warlords,  although  warlords  have
largely disappeared from the political landscapes since the 1990s. Over the course of the
decades  the  conflict  has  changed  drastically  in  terms  of  actors,  power  balance  and
conflict resources. Some actors like the CPB have vanished and broken up into new
armies,  warlords have either surrendered and retired (Khun Sa) or transformed their
drug  empires  into  legal  businesses  (Lso  Hsing  Han  and  his  Asia  World  Company,
Myanmar's largest business conglomerate). Other major military players have suffered
from significant  phlebotomy like the KNU and its  Karen National  Liberation Army
(KNLA)  whose  defectors  have  regrouped  and  formed  for  example  the  Democratic
Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), which later allied with the Tatmadaw as Border Guard
Forces (BGF). But the KNLA is by far not the only party that has been weakened by
breakaway factions. Defections have been one of the prime reasons for the constant
reshuffling of the political and military landscape and the alteration of power balance
and conflict dynamics. They have created not only a highly atomized set of conflict
parties, making it difficult to assess the conflict and its dynamics, but also a volatile
conflict situation with little constant elements. This highly complex, heterogeneous and
volatile political landscape has evolved over decades and has been described by Mandy
Sadan (2009: 154 f.) as:
"A baffling array of both small and large ethnic armies, in almost every
11 “Buddha-Bata Myanmar Lumyo” or “To be a Myanmar is to be a Buddhist”.
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region  of  the  country,  have  at  some  point  emerged,  grown,  declined,
agglomerated, split, negotiated and, in the case of many, recently attempted
this difficult objectives of strategizing within armed ceasefires."
As the quote shows, th military landscape has fringed over the decades. The CPB alone
split  into  four  new  actors:  United  Wa  State  Army  (UWSA),  National  Democratic
Alliance Army (NDAA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and
New Democratic  Army-Kachin  (NDA-K).12 The  NDA-K and parts  of  the  MNDAA
transformed into BGFs under Tatmadaw command while the larger part of the MNDAA
constitutes  an  ambivalent  case  (see  below).  Khun Sa's  Mong Tai  Army (MTA) has
spawned the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) as well as other defectors.
Among other factors, these splits have affected the balance of power between the
conflict parties: the relative power relations have fluctuated. While there were times in
the first years after independence when the government controlled little more than the
city of  Yangon,  the  government  and the military have  incrementally increased their
territory at the expense of the ethnic armed groups over the decades, today controlling
larger parts of the country than ever before. The Tatmadaw is not only much better
equipped nowadays  but  with  its  over  400,000 soldiers  it  became one of  the largest
armies in the world. This development has altered the relative power balance in the
conflict  dramatically  in  favor  of  the  Tatmadaw.  The  military  is  furthermore  deeply
involved in the business sector and exerts strong influence in the country's  business
sector. The Tatmadaw's business operations are intertwined with military expansion and
control, a connection that is elaborated on later.
Warlords with similar status and power as Khun Sa and Lo Hsing Han have
disappeared  from  the  scene.  At  times,  the  private  armies  of  warlords  were  better
equipped than the Tatmadaw soldiers (Lintner 2007-11-01). Throughout the conflict the
role of the warlords differed from most other ethnic armies such as the KNLA or the
KIA inasmuch as they have sided with the government and the Tatmadaw on multiple
occasions against  the ethnic armies and have pursued economic and power political
goals from the beginning. In the 1960s, the government under Ne Win co-opted Khun
Sa, Lo Hsing Han and other warlords into their military operations as commanders of
the notorious Ka Kwe Ye (KKY) forces but they gave up their positions quite quickly
afterwards. 
Lo  switched  sides  repeatedly,  joining  the  rebels  in  the  1970s  until  he  was
12 The NDA-K was formally part of KIA but it was affiliated with the CPB for a long time. In 1989, 
NDA-K was formally formed an an own entity.
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arrested in 1973 by the Thai police and extradited to Myanmar (Ghosh 2013-07-10).
Later  his  company  engaged  in  business  with  the  government.  The  staunch  anti-
communist Khun Sa, himself of Shan-Chinese origin, remained nonetheless a welcome
ally against the CPB as well as against other ethnic armies, even though he publicly
maintained the image of fighting for the cause of the Shan. After his defection from the
KKY ranks and a brief period in prison, the government made a pact with Khun Sa in
1984 that he would use his troops to fight the insurgents in the difficult jungle terrain in
exchange for unhindered business with opium and its derivatives (Lintner 1994: 264).
During their KKY times, the warlords had to be self-reliant because the government had
no resources to spare for them, hence the allowance to do business however they saw
fit. This was due to of the dire financial situation of the government. However, the KKY
groups quickly only focused on their opium business and stopped fighting the CPB and
hence the KKY program was abandoned in 1975 (Kramer et al. 2014: 30). The KKY
commanders started to sell their opium in the border town of Tachilek for pure gold.
Hence the region became known as the Golden Triangle (Lintner 2007: 43)
One of the most intriguing aspects of this peripheral warlordism is the relative
wealth  the  opium revenue  has  created  in  some  towns,  for  example  Khun  Sa's  old
hideout in Homöng. Bertil Lintner has interviewed Khun Sa in 1994 and delivered the
following account of relative economic affluence in an impoverished country in which
especially the peripheries are plagued by extreme poverty:
“Homöng is a bustling town boasting well-stocked shops, Spacious market
places, a well laid-out grid of roads with street lights at night. […] There
are schools, a Buddhist monastery, a well equipped hospital with operating
theater and X-ray facilities, video halls, karaoke bars, two hotels, a disco
and  even  a  small  public  park  complete  with  pathways,  benches  and  a
Chinese-style pavilion. Overseas calls can be placed from two commercially
run telephone booths. Local artifacts, historical paintings and photographs
are on display in a newly opened cultural museum. A hydroelectric power
station  is  under  construction  which  will  replace  the  old  diesel-powered
generators  currently  providing  Homöng  with  electricity."  (Lintner
1994/B120).
Lintner also claims in the same article that, according to American estimates, Khun Sa's
enterprise totaled $200 million a year, an impressive figure in a poor country. However,
Homöng is by far not the only town booming because of opium revenue. The towns of
Panghsang  and  Mongla,  both  under  control  of  ceasefire  parties,  have  grown  into
developed towns with a similar living standards as well (McCartan 2009-11-04).
The two most notorious warlords have changed their lives and occupation in the
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later stages of their lives and retreated from the civil war. Lo Hsing Han's Asia World
company, led by his son Tun Myint Naing (also known as Steven Law) has established
good relations with the government. It has been one of the two companies that built the
new national capital Naypyitaw. It is furthermore managing Myanmar's most important
port, has been involved in reconstruction after the cyclone 'Nargis' in 2008 and was a
major  partner  in  the  now-suspended  Myitsone  dam-project  (McCartan  2012-04-27).
Khun Sa has not laundered his money into a large company but his children are well
established private entrepreneurs, particularly in Mandalay and Tachilek (Lintner 2007-
11-01). The smooth process of retiring and laundering money into legitimate businesses
supports  the  assertions  that  the  warlords  had  contacts  up  into  the  highest  ranks  of
government and military.
Various natural resources have come into play in addition to levying taxes: gems,
timber,  oil,  gas  and  drugs  have  all  fed  into  the  budgets  of  the  conflict  parties,
exacerbating  the  conflict  between  the  government  and  many of  its  opponents.  The
exploitation of natural resources prevented any mutual hurting stalemate that could have
forced the conflict parties to negotiate peace. The role of of natural resources has varied
over the decades and altered the conflict dynamics. After Khun Sa's surrender in 1996,
the Tatmadaw took over his drug empire and received direct revenue from the drug
trade (Arnold 2005: 150f.). The revenues have prevented state and army collapse and
helped bridging the time period until  the oil  and gas resources in the Andaman Sea
could be exploited (Carey 1997: 13). Since then, the drug money has ceased as a major
source of financing of the army but local army commanders are reportedly still involved
in the drug business, especially because also local Tatmamdaw forces need to be self-
reliant (Kramer et al. 2014: 35f.). Some ethnic rebel armies have gained and lost control
over natural resources, especially in the case of gemstones. Different rebel groups have
utilized different natural resources for sustaining themselves. While the CPB, its main
successor UWSA and other groups in the Wa hills and Kokang work with revenues from
opium  cultivation,  the  Kachin  Independence  Army  has  relied  on  mining  of  jade,
sapphires and rubies (Lintner 1990: 39). Logging of timber has also been a source of
income for several conflict parties, for example the KIA, and it continues to produce
major revenues for some, both those who have and who have not agreed a ceasefire with
the government (Nyein Nyein 2015-01-06). 
In the aftermath of the CPB's demise and disintegration in 1989, the government
has significantly extended its  influence over the country's  territory through ceasefire
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agreements with the breakaway factions of the CPB, especially the UWSA, the most
powerful ethnic army today and an actor that will play an important role in later stages
of  this  thesis.  Despite  the  territorial  gains,  the  government  has  never  succeeded  in
exerting control over the entire territory of Myanmar, something it has in common with
the former British colonial administration. To this day, large swathes of land remain
under control of ethnic armed groups although these “liberated zones” have decreased in
number and size since the 1970ies (Petrie and South 2014: 223).
The extension of territory became possible through ceasefires and through what
Kevin Woods (2011) has termed ceasefire capitalism. The ceasefires included promises
of  semi-autonomy,  the  allowance  to  stay  armed,  material  support  and  business
privileges:  mining,  logging  and  large  scale  opium  cultivation  (Strategic  Studies
Committee  (Ethnic  Nationalities  Council)  2008:  14).  Although  the  ceasefire  parties
formally retain control of their territories, the government and the Tatmadaw have bit by
bit extended their sphere of influence at the ceasefire parties' expense. The means by
which territory is de facto seized is money. Through a redirection of money into the
ceasefire  zones,  officially  for  purposes  of  economic  development,  and  through
orchestrated business deals, often with businessmen of Chinese origin, the control of the
ethnic armed groups has waned in their own territory. Often the financial investments
are accompanied by the deployment of Tatmadaw soldiers which, under the ceasefire
deals,  co-share  authority  with  the  former  military  opponent  in  the  now-ceasefire
territory.  The ceasefires therefore enabled the military to enter  territories they never
managed to access prior to the ceasefires because the military failed to score significant
military victories. Or in Woods (2011: 749) succinct words:
“However, different territories, and the authority figures that exert control
over them, overlap to create conditions where national military and state
officials  share  power  with  non-state  authority  figures,  such  as  ceasefire
political organizations, insurgent groups and paramilitaries. [...] Burmese
state and military officials direct capital flows into resource-rich, non-state
uplands as an act of creating effective national state and military authority,
sovereignty  and  territory  in  practice.  In  this  way  a  military  regime
appropriates  (trans-)  national  capital  networks  to  form  military–private
partnerships to solidify de jure sovereignty into de facto territorial control.”
The incremental acquisition of territory is therefore part of a process of state-building at
the  expense  of  ethnic  armed  groups  that  fought  for  autonomy and  self-determined
government in their highlands (and in earlier times: independence). The ceasefire deals
are a double-edged sword, to say the least, and they drive wedges not only between
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various ethnic armed groups but also between the ethnic elites negotiating the ceasefires
and  the  populations  they  claim  to  represent  (Ibid.:  753).  The  implications  of  this
dilemma will be discussed in detail in later chapters.
It is difficult to make a realistic assessment of where Myanmar stands in 2015 in
terms of conflict resolution. The situation is volatile and fighting, mostly small-scale
skirmishes, continues in various regions of the country, paralleling the ceasefire talks. A
17-years long ceasefire between the government and the Kachin Independence Army
(KIA),  one  of  the  major  military  and  political  players,  collapsed  in  2011  after  the
government  broke  the  truce  by  attacking  KIA forces  (Petrie  &  South  2014:  224).
According to the United Nations, over 100,000 people have been internally displaced
since 201113 (Radio Free Asia (RFA) 2014-11-19). Recent months have seen an increase
in fighting with several larger battles taking place in the states of Kachin (North), Kayin
and  Mon (both  Southeast)  and  Shan  (Northeast).  Clashes  in  the  Kokang  region  of
Northeastern Shan State in March 2015 between the military and the MNDAA have left
more  than  a  100  soldiers  dead  (RFA 2015-03-19).  The  case  of  he  MNDAA is
controversial in terms of their ceasefire status. While RFA maintains that KIA and the
Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) are the only non-ceasefire groups among the
sixteen major ethnic armies as of March 2015 (RFA 2014-11-20), the Myanmar Peace
Monitor14 lists the MNDAA as a non-ceasefire group together with KIA and TNLA and
several minor  armies.  Whatever  the status  is,  as the aforementioned incidents show,
fighting continues despite existing ceasefire agreements.
The  conflict  continues  on  several  levels  in  different  locations  and  remains
opaque. This brief overview of Myanmar's turbulent recent history should provide the
reader with enough information to understand, if not the whole conflict, at least how
multifaceted, complex and rapidly changing the Myanmar civil war has been. It is in
this  environment  that  opium  has  become  such  a  convenient  and  highly  profitable
resource for some of the conflict parties. Before analyzing the conflict and the ceasefire
talks with the spoiler concept, a brief history of opium in Myanmar and Southeast Asia
is necessary in order to understand the origin of opium's role as a financial resource,
utilized for conflict.
13 More detailed information can be found at the website of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR): http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4877d6.html, last accessed: 2015-03-23.
14 Myanmar Peace Monitor: Armed Ethnic Groups since 2009; Source: 
http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/armed-ethnic-groups, last accessed: 2015-03-26.
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4.3. A brief History of Opium in Southeast Asia and Myanmar
4.3.1. Opium, Colonial Empires and Asian Capitalism
Opium is deeply rooted in the economic and political history of both Southeast Asia,
China and colonial empires in the Far East, especially the British one. The history of
opium in Southeast Asia begins in the 7th and 8th centuries when Arab traders introduced
opium to China, where it has been used as medicine already a thousand years ago. The
earliest records of the use of opium in Southeast Asia date back to Thailand (1366) and
Myanmar (1519). However,  only in the 19th century did opium spread from Yunnan
province to  Northern  Myanmar,  notably to  Kokang and the Wa hills.  Until  the 19th
century, opium cultivation and consumption were already indigenous to many cultures
in Asia, especially China, but the use remained limited to licit recreational, medical and
cultural purposes only. It has therefore neither always been a major source of money in
the Golden Triangle nor has it always been illegal, despite being often portrayed so
(Lintner 2000: 1; Kramer et al. 2014: 40).
The 19th century marks a turning point in the history of opium when colonial
merchants transformed it into a commodity and consumer good taken only for pleasure,
resulting in widespread opium (and later heroin) addiction, especially in China. Opium
has, just as other plant-based stimulants, played a substantial role in both the rise of
colonial  empires  and the  development  of  modern  capitalist  structures  in  Asia.  Carl
Trocki (1999) has delved deep into the history of opium from 1750 to 1950 and its role
in the rise of global capitalism. His fascinating piece illuminates how far-reaching the
consequences of colonial trade with opium (and other drugs) have been. He (1999: xii)
argues that the rise of Europe and its colonial empires were only possible because of a
series  of  drug trades  in  the  period  of  1500-1900.  Opium has  played  a  special  role
inasmuch as it was the first commodity, other than silver, the Europeans could offer
China in exchange for its goods (Lintner 2000: 2). The markets in the Far East remained
largely impenetrable for European traders until the British started to mass produce and
purvey opium. The 19th century opium trade and the Opium Wars between England and
China (1839-42; 1856-60) destroyed the social  and political  structures in China and
Southeast Asia and helped to finance the creation of new structures. As a result, most
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colonial states in Southeast Asia were maintained by opium revenues and almost all
state structures in East and Southeast Asia used opium as a cash cow, way into the 20 th
century  (Trocki  1999:  9).  The  colonial  empires  in  Southeast  Asia  and  China  were
therefore  not  only  created  by  military  strength  but  also  by  undermining  existing
structures through trade with addictive consumer goods. Trocki (Ibid.: 59) concludes
that the dominance of European empires in the trade of tea, sugar, coffee, tobacco and
alcohol was not enough to bring Asia “down to its knees.” Opium did because it made
the rearrangement of global production forces possible that the other goods could not.
British  traders  accumulated  the  starting  capital  for  their  businesses  through
opium trade. British banks, insurance companies and merchant houses rooted in Asian
trade (especially in Hong Kong) were founded with opium revenues. A prime example
of a company with roots in the opium business is HSBC, the world's second largest
banking group (Conne 2010/02, Le Monde diplomatique). The opium became a key
factor of commercialization because as a commodity it created other commodities: land,
labor, fiscal relations, and state structures (Trocki 1999: 9).
However, not only Europeans used opium revenue to launch their businesses.
Merchants  in  China  and  Southeast  Asia  poured  opium  money  into  other  business
branches  and in  the aftermath  of  the dissolution of  colonial  empires,  took over  the
opium trade  (Ibid.:  10).  The  trade  of  opium and  its  derivatives  heroin  and ATS in
Myanmar  is  intimately connected  to  merchants  in  China,  and to  a  lesser  degree  in
Thailand,  who  organize  and  run  the  networks.  The  opium is  merely  cultivated  by
farmers in Myanmar and the trade is for the most part in the hands of Chinese merchants
who cut in Myanmar-based militias and ethnic armed groups in part of their profits in
exchange for protection, collecting the harvest and refining derivatives. Thailand's role
in production in the Golden Triangle is relatively limited but it is an important hub for
money laundering and the major transit country for heroin from Myanmar and Laos
(Arnold 2005: 154) as well as its main consumer market for ATS.
The sheer size of the shadow economy dealing with drugs and money laundering
makes it impossible for poor countries like Myanmar or Laos to refuse this boost in
capital  (Ibid.:  212).  The  Myanmar  government  has  in  the  1990s  relied  on  opium
revenues and started initiatives to co-opt the drug money into the legal economy for
example by levying a “whitening tax” of initially 40 per cent, then later 25 per cent on
repatriated funds and by de facto legalizing the black market exchange rate of 300-350
Kyat per US dollar.  As a result,  large sums of money flowed into the country from
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Singapore,  Hong  Kong  and  Bangkok  (Lintner  2000:  19)  The  government  also
encouraged former insurgents to invest in legitimate businesses.15 Cooperation with for
example  the  Asia  World  company  shows  that  there  is  acceptance  for  drug-funded
businesses among the political elites in Myanmar.
4.3.2. Opium in Myanmar
Opium use has a long history in Myanmar, especially the peripheral highlands. Opium is
less addictive than its derivatives and has been used in Myanmar and other countries in
Southeast Asia for generations. Its uses include recreation, cultural rituals, medicine and
pain relief and is much less stigmatized than for example heroin use and addiction. In
the  late  19th century  opium  spread  through  Yunnan  province  into  the  hills  of
Northeastern Myanmar (as well as to Northern Thailand and French Indochina). The
opium cultivation, however, remained a small-scale phenomenon until the post-World
War II times (Lintner 2000: 4f.).
The turbulent years after the Second World War saw Aung San's assassination in
1947, Myanmar's independence in 1948 and the communist victory in China in 1949.
After Mao Zedong's victory and the proclamation the People's Republic of China, KMT
forces  fled into Shan state  of Myanmar from where they repeatedly tried to  invade
Yunnan province.  After military confrontation with the Myanmar army, KMT forces
were driven into Kokang and the Wa hills, the two best areas for growing opium in Shan
state (Ibid.: 7). When the KMT and other groups started to get involved in the opium
trade to create revenues for military purposes, opium cultivation and drug production
skyrocketed. Opium became a conflict resource. Lintner quotes Tuan Shi-wen (Duan
Xiwen), a KMT commander who openly proclaimed in 1967:
We have to continue to fight the evil of communism and to fight you must
have an army, and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have
money. In these mountains, the only money is opium.
Lintner (Ibid.: 7) remarks the following about Tuan She-wen's words:
This statement prophetically described why so many other armed groups in
the Shan States – including the Burmese government's own army and local
militia forces – would become involved in the complex politics of the Golden
Triangle drug trade.
This quote, in turn, greatly explains the role of opium as a resource of conflict.
15 GlobalSecurity.org: Burma Insurgency; Source: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/burma.htm, last accessed: 2015-05-03.
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The production of opium has increased dramatically since military actors got
involved in the 1950s. Notwithstanding the drastic changes of the conflict scenario and
setup,  including the collapse of  KMT forces  and several  other  armies  that  used the
opium trade to their advantage, opium has remained one of the most important resources
to pay for military equipment and to buy political power. Ironically, opium has survived
many of the armies that have turned it  into a conflict  commodity in the first  place,
including the KMT.
Any data regarding the actual amounts of opium cultivation (in hectares) and
production (in either metric tonnes or yield in kilogram per hectare) has to be treated
with caution, as the latest TNI report points out.16 UNODC provides a lot of data but the
data is based on satellite images and village surveys and can therefore not be entirely
verified. Other researchers also claim that the actual numbers of opium production in
both Wa state and entire  Myanmar might be exaggerated (Chin 2009:  55).  Nobody,
however,  doubts  opium  as  a  widespread,  profitable  conflict  resource.  Against  this
backdrop of consensus on the role of opium, the UNODC data is considered reliable for
this thesis.
Today, Myanmar remains the second largest opium producer in the world after
Afghanistan. It was the world's largest producer of opium until 1991, peaking in the
1980s, when Afghanistan superseded it primarily due to higher yields per hectare (SEA
Opium Survey 2014: 49).17 The area under cultivation remained higher in Myanmar
until  2002. The most recent data  by UNODC is from 2014. According to the latest
Southeast Asian Opium survey covering Myanmar and Lao PDR,  57,600 hectare are
under cultivation in Myanmar, almost triple the amount of 2006 (21,600 hectares) (Ibid.:
11; 13). The recent surge of opium cultivation since 2006 has inspired the title of the
2014 TNI report “Bouncing Back: Relapse in the Golden Triangle” and came after a
period of consequent decline since 1997. Opium is cultivated mostly in remote areas to
avoid detection and eradication. The government runs an eradication program despite
some branches of the military being involved. These programs are limited to physical
destruction  of  crops  and  have  had  disastrous  economic  consequences  for  poor
subsistence farmers in the Myanmar highlands.
89 percent of opium in Myanmar is grown in Shan state of which 44 percent is
16 TNI remarks that UNODC has a "monopoly of truth" and that its numbers are "guesstimates" (Kramer
et al. 2014: 20f.).
17 2014 UNODC data: yield in Myanmar: 11.7 kilograms per hectare, yield in Afghanistan: 28.7 
kilograms per hectare (UNODC SEA Opium Survey 2014: 14f.).
47
grown its South, 30 percent in the East state and 15 percent in North (Ibid.: 52). Kokang
and the Wa hills, two areas known for opium cultivation. Shan state remains not only a
battleground where the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups continue to clash (see recent
incidents above), it  is also home to myriad different groups that are using opium to
generate financial revenue for various purposes. While militias, local Tatmadaw units as
well as some ethnic armed groups use it to sustain and enrich themselves, other groups
have additional uses. The UWSA, for example, pours large amounts of opium money
into state-building and the public sector, for example into building schools, roads, power
plants  and  other  infrastructure  (Chin  2009:  2).  This  does  not,  however,  mean  that
UWSA leaders refrain from enriching themselves with the opium money (Ibid.: 2; 43).
Opium remains the backbone of both the economy in many regions in Shan state
and the armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the remaining ethnic armed groups.
But albeit it being used to acquire military equipment and to pay soldiers, it's impact on
conflict duration, and therefore the question of spoiling for economic purposes, is not as
straightforward and clear as it  may seem. The Myanmar civil  war does not entail  a
clear-cut tendency towards extension of conflict for economic reasons. The following
chapters will look into the role of those actors who are involved in the drug trade in
more detail and shed some light on why opium and its exploitation as a resource have
not only prolonged but in some cases also shortened conflict.
5. Analysis and Discussion
The following chapter applies the spoiler concept to the current process of negotiating a
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). A few remarks on the difference between the
situation in Myanmar and other conflicts are necessary before delving into the analysis.
There  are  significant  differences  between  the  conflict  at  hand  and  those  that  were
analyzed in the literature.
Unlike the spoiler concepts that have been introduced in earlier chapters, the
concept used in this thesis does not include the prominent role of the custodians of
peace processes. This is because the NCA negotiations remain a domestic issue and
external interference, except limited facilitation efforts by for example the Norwegian
government, is not part of the process. The NCA negotiations are not an international
forum with external actors backing the conflict parties. External actors such as China
and the ASEAN do exert a certain influence on some of the conflict parties but their
48
influence is limited to encouraging them to reach a peace deal (South 2014: 253). This
difference is necessary to mention because the original spoiler concept was conceived
from  the  perspective  of  the  custodians  of  peace  processes.  In  the  following,  the
perspective  of  the  custodians  is  omitted  and  replaced  with  the  perspective  of  an
academic observer and analyst of the conflicts in Myanmar.
The other obvious difference to the conflicts  that  Stedman and other authors
have used to demonstrate their own concepts is that the Myanmar civil war has a myriad
amount more actors involved. This makes the conflict more complex than for example
the ones in Angola, Mozambique and Cambodia which have featured only two or three
parties.
Another  aspect  of  the  conflict  and  the  NCA negotiations  that  needs  to  be
discussed is its ambiguity. Can the ceasefire negotiations be called a peace process?
What form of peace does it intend to establish? And does it even intend to establish
peace? There are critical voices that see the process as a sham by the government and
the Tatmadaw to gain control over new territories (see for example Wood's ceasefire
capitalism). They argue that the successive military governments have a track record of
using bilateral ceasefires to divide the EAGs and prevent them from forming a united
front.  This  has  been  practiced  in  the  late  1980ies  and  early  1990ies  when  the
government entered ceasefire agreements with the breakaway factions of the CPB, such
as the UWSA, which included the condition to not side with other EAGs against the
government. Furthermore, the government still insists that the remaining EAGs ought to
be transformed into BGF under the control of the Tatmadaw.
Whether this is true or not, it does not mean that the outcome of the NCA talks is
unable to end the fighting and the internal displacement of villagers. When evaluating
the NCA process, it is necessary to be clear about what one expects of the negotiations.
Is it genuine, positive peace, a state free of direct and indirect (structural) violence in
which all human beings can flourish (Galtung 2000: 11-13)? Then the NCA process will
not live up to the expectations. But if the goal is to first and foremost put an end to the
physical instances of violence, then the NCA negotiations can be seen as a step on a
ladder.  Not  withstanding  the  possibility  that  the  government  and  the  Tatmadaw's
motives  are  dishonest,  the  ceasefires  have  shown  improvements  for  the  civilian
population living in some of the ceasefire zones, including easier traveling, less abuse
by conflict parties, and the possibility to spend more time on farm fields and to reach
markets to sell goods. However, this does not apply to all ceasefire zones: the situation
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in remote borderlands has not improved significantly (Petrie and South 2014: 225). 
The nationwide ceasefire entails the opportunity to establish a form of negative
peace, meaning the absence, or at least significant reduction, of warfare, other physical
instances  of  violence  as  well  as  abuse  and  internal  displacement  of  the  civilian
population. Hence, the NCA negotiations are in the following understood as a process to
establish a  certain  form of  negative  peace  that  puts  an  end to  direct  violence.  This
outcome is  compatible  with  possible  dishonest  motives  of  the  government  and  the
Tatmadaw.
With the NCA process being defined, the following sections shed light on the
NCA negotiations, the different actors participating in the negotiations as well as the
opportunity structures that influence the actors and their behavior.
5.1. Analysis of the Conflict and the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)
The Myanmar civil war is characterized by a multitude of different actors with a variety
of  ethnic,  political  and  economic  backgrounds  and  a  volatile  political  landscape.
Although the conflict  is divided in several little and midsize civil wars between the
Tatmadaw and a variety of EAGs, they will be henceforth subsumed under the label of
'Myanmar civil war' to avoid dissipation and confusion. Thus, the term 'Myanmar civil
war' will be used to denote the all-encompassing framework of the conflict along with
all the actors involved. 
The actors analyzed in the following subsection are the most important  ones
because they have the capabilities and military prowess  to  spoil  the negotiations  or
potentially reasons to do so. Furthermore, since the purpose of this thesis is to find out
whether actors from the drug business are likely to be spoilers, only those actors will be
looked at who are known to be involved in the drug business in the Golden Triangle.
Many other actors are rather small and with only limited power and influence. They are
only occasionally looked at when deemed necessary.
Before coming to the individual analysis of actors it is imperative to introduce
the process of drafting the NCA. The NCA negotiations have started in 2013 and have
as of May 2015 included seven rounds of talks. The NCA negotiations include the vast
majority of the most important EAGs in the country through the United Nationalities
Federal Council (UNFC), a joint organization by different ethnic groups responsible for
the oversight of the ceasefire negotiation team (see below). The UNFC has a variety of
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members with different statuses. Some of the UNFC members have a bilateral ceasefire
agreement  with  the  government,  for  example  the  KNU,  while  others  have  not  (for
example the KIA). In addition come several parties who are not members of the UNFC
but  who  officially  follow  its  leadership  in  the  NCA negotiations  (for  example  the
Arakan Liberation Party, ALP). Other groups such as the UWSA follow the UNFC's
leadership only unofficially while being supportive of its goals.
This united front of a variety of different EAGs shows that the fronts in the
conflict have become more pronounced in recent years which marks a change from the
past decades of the civil war which saw different EAGs having difficulties to forge a
lasting  alliance.  This  unity  is  still  fragile  and  the  current  status  with  only  two
negotiating actors must not be taken as a solidified and final state. The history of the
Myanmar civil war has it that alliances shift and falter rather quickly when the political
circumstances change.
The two actors  that  are  involved in  the  process  are  the  government's  Union
Peace Working Committee (UPWC) and the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team
(NCCT). The NCCT is the negotiation team of the ethnic nationalities and represents
the majority of the EAGs (Inkey 2015-04-01). It is headed by Nai Hong Sar of the New
Mon State Party (NMSP).
The UPWC represents the government  and the Tatmadaw. It  is  supported by
facilitators such as the Myanmar Peace Center which receives generous funding by the
European Union (Saw Yan Naing 2014-03-18). Head of the UPWC is minister Aung
Min who has been engaged in negotiating a ceasefire with the EAGs for several years
by now. An extended list of the members of NCCT and the UNFC can be found in the
annex or on the website of the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI).18 19
As  of  May  2015,  the  NCA has  produced  some  limited  results.  Against  the
backdrop of escalating violence and regular clashes between the Tatmadaw and the KIA
in Kachin state, the MNDAA in Kokang and the Arakan Army (AA) and Rakhine state,
a first draft of the NCA has been agreed between the NCCT and the UPWC at the end of
March  2015.  The  draft  was  discussed  at  a  meeting  at  the  UWSA headquarter  in
Panghsang in early May 2015 which resulted in a public proclamation of unity and joint
reiterated demands for a federalized Myanmar (RFA 2015-05-07). The details of the
18 Peace Process Overview: http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/peace-process/peace-process-overview, 
last accessed: 2015-04-24.
19 Stakeholders Overview: http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/stakeholders-overview, last 
accessed: 2015-04-24.
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NCA are yet to be discussed.
The claim for the following subsections is that none of the actors involved in the
narcotics  trade  has,  under  the  current  circumstances,  reasons  to  spoil  the  ceasefire
process or its results. On the contrary, ceasefires with the government have proved to be
more profitable than continued war which supports Michael Ross' alternative theory that
natural  resources  may  also  shorten  conflict.  The  only  possible  alteration  of
circumstances  that  is  likely to  spark  spoiling  behavior  in  order  to  protect  the  own
business would be that the NCA or the government's future agenda includes a serious
attempt to radically curb the opium cultivation and thus the highly profitable business
attached to it. Martin Smith fully agrees with this line of thought.20 This means that it is
mainly in  the  hands  of  future  governments  whether  or  not  actors  implicated  in  the
opium business resort to spoiling. Why the government is unlikely to seriously attempt
to curb the narcotics trade is explained later on.
5.2. Analysis of Actors and Structures
“Some of these communities have reverted to cultivating opium as a means
to  survive.  Over  the  years,  the  drug trade  and insurgency  politics  have
become increasingly intertwined. Almost all parties to the conflicts in drug
producing regions have in some way been involved in or profited from the
drug trade. This is especially the case with government-backed militias in
Burma.” (Kramer et al. 2014: 25)
This  quote  by  a  recent  TNI  report  highlights  greatly  the  problematic  situation  in
Myanmar's  Northern  and  Northeastern  peripheries:  virtually  every  conflict  party  is
involved in one way or another in the business with opium and its derivatives. Only a
few groups have stayed out of the trade entirely while especially those groups in the Wa
hills, Kokang and other parts of Shan state have relied heavily on opium as a conflict
resource.  The  reason why some groups  have  managed  to  avoid  opium is  that  they
utilized other sources to generate revenue such as jade, gems and timber. Shan state is,
however,  scarce  in  natural  resources  with  opium being the  only source  of  revenue.
Especially in Shan state it became very difficult for any of the conflict parties to stay out
of the drug trade.21
It is necessary, then, to have a closer look at which actors are implicated in the
drug trade and which of them have reasons to spoil any ceasefire or peace agreement for
20 Interview with Martin Smith, April 20th 2015.
21 Interview with Tom Kramer, January 15th 2015.
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economic reasons. In the following, the thesis addresses three major groups of actors:
the  Tatmadaw,  some of  the  ethnic  armed groups and the  Tatmadaw-backed militias
which used to be insurgents but agreed to be put under Tatmadaw control in exchange
for unobstructed business opportunities. The militias are reportedly the most involved in
the drug trade and have abandoned their political goals entirely for economic ones.22 23 
At the same time, the opportunity structures in which these actors operate are
addressed and their capabilities to spoil are scrutinized. This means that both the actor
and structure variables are combined in the analysis because it is impossible to discuss
them separately: whenever the behavior of an actor is under scrutiny, references to its
environment are inevitable. The combination of the two variables is a clear difference to
other concepts that claim to have looked at either actors or structures. In fact, neither
Stedman nor Greenhill and Major ultimately discard structures or actors entirely from
their  analysis.  The  decision  to  analyze  the  two  together  should  therefore  not  be
understood as a novelty but rather as simply acknowledging the fact that the two should
not and cannot be separated if the goal is to fully understand why certain groups resort
to spoiling while others do not.
***
In order to understand the Tatmadaw as an actor, it is important to recur shortly to the
difference between the government and the military: it is unclear how much control the
current quasi-civilian government of president Thein Sein exerts over it (Moe 2014:
277).  Some  observers  claim  the  government  has  only  very  little  control  over  the
Tatmadaw (Petrie and South 2014: 227). Although their motives and goals overlap in
many fields,  some observers assert  that the gap between the two has widened since
former  generals  started  to  reform the  country.  The Tatmadaw is  described as  being
cautious and wary of recent changes in the country and of giving in to too many of the
EAGs'  demands  (Ghosh  2013-07-10;  Kramer  et  al.  2014:  35f.).  These  opaque
differences have to be kept in mind for the coming analysis. In addition, the militias
who have agreed ceasefires with the government are controlled by the Tatmadaw and
not by the government.24
Is the Tatmadaw a potential spoiler? The answer to this question depends on the
22 Ibid.
23 Interview with Ashley South, January 23rd 2015.
24 Interview with Tom Kramer, January 15th 2015.
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perspective that is taken. Two reasons for spoiling behavior are plausible under current
circumstances but only one has links to the narcotics trade. The first reason is political
and relates to the NCA negotiations and a possible peaceful settlement. The military is
undoubtedly an obstacle to peace due to its ideological resistance to the demands of the
ethnic nationalities and its refusal to agree to any substantial concessions made by the
government to accommodate them. However, the potential to spoil in this case is not
because of its implications in the drug business and therefore irrelevant for the research
question but it had to be mentioned for the sake of completeness. 
 The  question  about  the  Tatmadaw's  spoiling  potential  with  regard  to  its
involvement in the opium business is more complex. To find an answer, it is necessary
to look at the position and the locus of the potential spoiler problem and distinguish
between the leadership and the rank and file deployed on the local level. The Tatmadaw
is participating in the ceasefire talks and spoiling behavior is only likely to occur when
its  personnel  attempts  to  shape  the  process  in  its  favor;  that  is,  if  the  Tatmadaw
leadership does not decide to spoil the NCA deal entirely for political and ideological
reasons.  Possible  concessions  the  Tatmadaw  could  demand  are  protection  of  the
businesses of its local commanders and guarantees for their units to stay deployed in
ceasefire areas (this demand would have two sides to it: the economic and the political).
These  demands  are  rather  hypothetical  and the  question  remains  whether  economic
reasons exist why the Tatmadaw would spoil the ceasefire deal.
How, then,  does the aspect  of locus influence the Tatmadaw's behavior? The
leadership and higher ranks are unlikely to spoil the ceasefire process or its results for
economic reasons because they are not deeply implicated in the opium business. More
interesting is if the rank and file, meaning individual local commanders and units who
are reportedly involved in the business (Kramer et al 2014: 35f.)25, have reasons enough
to resort to spoiling behavior. The two main incentives of the local branches to protect
their drug business are on the one hand self-enrichment by the leadership. On the other
hand,  many  local  Tatmadaw  branches  must  be  self-reliant  because  the  central
government does not provide them with funding to maintain their operations. Do these
factors provide enough reason to resort to spoiling behavior?
Under the current circumstances, the answer is no. Unless the opium cultivation
and  the  lucrative  drug  business  are  seriously  tackled,  no  spoiling  behavior  can  be
expected by local Tatmadaw commanders (and even if that were to happen it remains
25 Interview with Ashley South, January 23rd 2015.
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questionable if it would provoke serious attempts to bring down the ceasefire process).
The NCA does not intend to curb the opium cultivation.  On the contrary,  given the
nature of the already existing bilateral ceasefire agreements, it is more likely that the
NCA will  include  continued  unhindered  business  opportunities  for  the  parties  in
exchange  for  laying  down  weapons  and  potentially  transforming  into  BGF  under
Tatmadaw control.  Local Tatmadaw units  would not be obstructed in their  business,
either just  as they have not been affected by the already existing ceasefires.  Ashley
South agrees that an end of armed conflict will not affect the drug business in any way
and that the NCA does not give any incentives to resort to spoiling.26 
The  Tatmadaw  is  definitely  in  the  position  to  spoil  from  a  capabilities
perspective  but  this  does  not  necessarily  translate  into  spoiling  behavior.
Notwithstanding the current military clashes in the country in which the Tatmadaw is
suffering significant losses, the circumstances favor the Tatmadaw inasmuch as it is the
strongest military actor in the conflict and as it has expanded the territory it controls at
the expense of other conflict parties. The Tatmadaw is today much better equipped than
it used to be. This is because the government started to exploit natural resources such as
oil and gas in Myanmar's offshore fields.27 In addition, Martin Smith points out that the
ongoing fighting is taking a toll on the smaller conflict parties with limited resources
and that it is not easy to maintain armies and logistics.28 
The Tatmadaw leadership will decide how to act based on the outcomes of the
NCA negotiations or where the negotiations seem to lead, respectively. The Tatmadaw is
most likely able to beat most EAGs in open warfare but the terrain favors guerrilla wars
and the military advantage does not automatically translate into military victories. And
since the most significant territorial gains were accomplished through ceasefires, the
Tatmadaw is  likely  to  remain  committed  to  the  NCA process  as  long  as  the  chief
negotiators do not cross any red lines (for example wide-ranging promises of autonomy)
and as long as their local commanders along with their economic interests are protected.
This  borders,  however,  again  on  the  political  dimension  of  spoiling  behavior.  Both
Martin  Smith  and  Tom  Kramer  agree  that  no  spoiling  behavior  can  be  currently
expected by Tatmadaw units, that is, as long as only the economic perspective is taken
into account (political reasons to spoil remain).29 30
26 Ibid.
27 Interview with Matti Ojanperä, January 16th 2015.
28 Interview with Martin Smith, April 20th 2015.
29 Ibid.
30 Interview with Tom Kramer, January 15th 2015.
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***
The  next  step  is  to  discuss  whether  the  NCA negotiations  might  provoke  spoiling
behavior  by  some  of  the  EAGs.  Again,  the  answer  is  no  under  the  current
circumstances. 
The largest of the relevant EAGs is the UWSA, one of the CPB's breakaway
factions and one of the earliest to enter a ceasefire agreement with the government in
1989. It controls important border regions together with a major share of Shan state's
opium cultivation  and the lucrative  business  attached to  it.  As a  result  of  the  1989
ceasefires, the opium cultivation, the yield and the drug refining skyrocketed to hitherto
unknown levels  and  the  UWSA is  one  of  the  major  actors  who made  this  happen
(Lintner 2007: 131). It became the main supplier of ATS for the Thai market (Chin
2009: 4). 
The  revenues  with  which  the  UWSA sustains  itself  are  generated  by taxing
opium farmers. Large sums of money were poured in the public sector in Wa state, an
administrative part of Shan state officially called “Myanmar Shan State No. 2 Special
Region.” Wa state is still supposed to be independent according to the official UWSA
agenda. In terms of capabilities, the UWSA is a powerful actor: it boasts 25,000 soldiers
(Kivimäki et al 2010: 7) and has purchased sophisticated military equipment through
China,  including  Man-Portable  Air  Defense  Systems  (MANPADS).  The  Myanmar
government is cautious to not shatter the ceasefire agreement with the UWSA as if now,
although rumors had it that the government had plans to launch a military offensive
against it in late 2014 (Lintner 2014-04-30) but which ultimately did not happen.
The UWSA is a prime example of disproving Greenhill and Major's notion that
only capabilities and opportunity structures affect the behavior of a potential spoiler.
Despite  its  military  prowess,  its  economic  resources  and  the  weakness  of  the
government and Tatmadaw in 1989, the UWSA concluded a ceasefire agreement instead
of continuing to fight. It arguably could have gained much more in terms of territory by
making use of its resources and the favorable circumstances. The UWSA perceived a
ceasefire as being more profitable than continued warfare and exploited the concessions
of the agreement to the fullest. Has this changed in 2015? 
 Despite occasional disputes about border trade posts and muscle flexing, the
ceasefire  of 1989 has proven to be stable  and has remained intact.  The UWSA has
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sticked to its policies of autonomy and development of Wa state and maintains friendly
relationships  with  the  Chinese  (regional)  government  behind  the  Myanmar-China
border. The UWSA is an unofficial supporter of the NCCT team and thus not directly
involved in the NCA negotiations. However, it hosted an EAG summit in its territory in
early May 2015 to discuss the preliminary results of the NCA negotiations. The UWSA
is a staunch opponent of the transformation into BGF under Tatmadaw control and it
remains to be seen what the reaction towards the NCA negotiation results will be. The
details of the NCA are still not drafted but the BGF transformation issue is likely to
spark plenty of protest among many of the EAGs, including the UWSA. The opposition
to the BGF program is, however, of political nature rather than motivated by economic
calculations.
More interesting is how the UWSA perceives a ceasefire agreement against the
backdrop of their lucrative drug business. Ko-Lin Chin (2009: 43) notes that “the Wa”,
meaning ordinary people, do not profit from the drug business. Only the Wa leaders, the
Wa authorities  and the  affiliated  Chinese  businessmen do.  The  locus  of  a  potential
spoiler problem would therefore be the leadership and not the rank and file. But does the
leadership have any reasons to spoil the NCA process? The answer is no since the NCA
will most likely not address the drug issue, the UWSA is unlikely to engage in spoiling
behavior as long as their drug business remains untouched.
Another EAG that needs to be looked at  is  the MNDAA from Kokang. It is
known to be implicated in the drug trade and it has initiated new rounds of fighting with
the Tatmadaw in February 2015. It stands to reason that the recent outbreak of violence
and the military advances of the MNDAA could be a move to spoil the NCA process.
Why would the MNDAA resort to spoiling? 
It is currently not recognized by the government as a negotiation partner but it is
a  member  of  the  NCCT.  In  early  May the  MNDAA threatened  to  resign  from the
coordination team along with the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the AA
(RFA 2015-05-05;  Lun  Min  Mang  2015-05-07).  Mikael  Gravers  suspects  that  the
MNDAA is afraid to be “squeezed out of business.” Their military offenses are attempts
to reconquer lost ground and territory.31 It is questionable whether this military offenses
serve a military and political purpose or whether economic considerations are the reason
for the new outbreaks of violence. It seems that the renewed fighting is not intended to
bring  down the  NCA as  a  solution  to  the  conflict  but  rather  to  reconquer  strategic
31 Interview with Mikael Gravers, April 16th 2015. 
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territory that the MNDAA feels was illegitimately taken from them in 2009 during the
last clashes with the military.32 However, the recent talks among the EAGs in Wa state's
Panghsang have brought about a unified declaration of the NCCT members that the
MNDAA (as well as the TNLA and AA) should be part of the NCA process. The NCCT
members  jointly  urged  the  government  to  recognize  all  three  actors  as  legitimate
negotiation partners and to stop the attacks on their forces (RFA 2015-05-07). 
From  this  perspective,  the  MNDAA's  actions  could  be  considered  spoiling
behavior in order to become part of the process. But although retaking lost territory
would certainly entail economic advantages, the prime motivation seems to be political
and military. If the the MNDAA's actions are considered spoiling behavior, then this
would  happen for  political  reasons but  not  because  it  wants  to  prevent  peace  from
materializing to protect its drug business. It remains unclear, however, if the MNDAA
intends to push for a seat in the ceasefire talks with its current actions. In any case, the
MNDAA is not resorting to spoiling behavior to protect business interests.
The other groups that are currently fighting the Tatmadaw are not motivated by
economic interests, either. On the contrary, the TNLA, the armed wing of the Palaung
State Liberation Front (PSLF), is arguably the EAG which is the most opposed to the
drug problem,  as  Martin  Smith  points  out.  The  TNLA attempts  to  reduce  the  drug
production and use because the addiction rate has gone up dramatically during the time
of its ceasefire with the government. The high addiction rate is gravely affecting the
Palaung population in the TNLA's territory.33 The AA fights for political recognition in
Rakhine state and is therefore not spoiling to protect business interests either.
***
The militias are the last group that needs to be looked at since most of them are deeply
involved in the drug business.34 35 
The militias are former enemies of the government and the Tatmadaw that have
entered  ceasefires  and  agreed  to  be  put  under  the  control  of  the  Tatmadaw.  The
concessions  granted  for  these  demands  of  the  government  included  unobstructed
business  with  an open encouragement  to  engage in  any kind of  business,  since  the
government would or could not fund the militias with money from its own budget. In
32 Interview with Martin Smith, April 20th 2015.
33 Ibid.
34 Interview with Tom Kramer, January 15th 2015.
35 Interview with Ashley South, January 23rd 2015.
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practice,  militias  retain  control  of  certain  areas  where  they  are  allowed  to  tax  the
population and any trade passing through their territory. These militias are mostly small
and range from 10 to a few hundred soldiers. Unlike most EAGs who remain committed
to concrete political goals, the militias are only engaged in business of which they “can
live off happily”, as Tom Kramer points out.36 Some of the militias retain an official
ethnic agenda but the reasons for them to agree to ceasefires were mostly of economic
nature  (Strategic  Studies  Committee  (Ethnic  Nationalities  Council)  2008:  8f.).
Examples  are  the  Pansay  Militia  in  Namkham  Township,  the  Manpang  Militia  in
Tangyan Township, and the Ta Moe Nye and the Kaungkha Militias in Kutkai Township
(Kramer et al. 2014: 31). 
None  of  these  groups  is  represented  in  the  NCA process  and  their  deep
involvement in the drug trade poses the question whether they could be spoilers of the
ceasefire  process  to  protect  their  business.  After  all,  they  seem  to  be  the  biggest
profiteers of the exuberant drug production in the peripheries.
But  similar  to  many  of  the  EAGs  who  have  agreed  a  ceasefire  with  the
government, the militias have under current circumstances no reason to sabotage the
NCA process.  The ceasefire  agreements provide the militias with generous business
opportunities and the NCA process does not undermine this setup in any way. It was
exactly the ceasefires that enabled the militias'  unhindered drug business in the first
place so the NCA will  not affect the militias at  all.  In fact,  the narcotics trade will
continue  with  or  without  a  nationwide  ceasefire  agreement  and  even  under
circumstances of genuine peace the business is not threatened.37 Spoiling behavior in
order to shape the ceasefire process is not necessary since the circumstances favor the
militias already, probably like no other actor in the conflict. Furthermore, the fact that
the  militias  are  not  represented  in  the  NCA process  gives  no incentives  to  spoil  to
become a part of the process because the Tatmadaw is involved on their behalf. The
Tatmadaw is in control of the militias and it has no interest in altering the environment
at  the expense of  both its  own ground forces  and the militias  involved in the drug
business. The question of locus is not relevant either because the militias as a whole
profit from the trade and neither the leadership nor the rank and file have reasons to
spoil the NCA.
And  even  if  the  militias  would  decide  to  engage  in  spoiling  behavior  for
36 Interview with Tom Kramer, January 15th 2015.
37 Interview with Martin Smith, April 20th 2015.
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whatever reason, they pose no threat to any form of agreement. The militias are neither
powerful nor influential enough to constitute a serious threat to either the Tatmadaw or
most other EAGs.38 39
Similar to the other actors, the militias do not have any reason to perceive the
NCA process or its potential results as a threat to their lucrative business. However, they
would be the most likely ones to lose should the drug problems be seriously tackled.
Ross' alternative theory is supported also in the case of the militias. The only thing that
would affect the militias would be a serious attempt to curb the opium cultivation and
the trade with heroin and ATS. 
5.3. Discussion: No drug-related Spoilers and the Effect of Opium on the 
Duration and Intensity of Conflict
It follows, therefore, that the major reason why no spoiling behavior has occurred as of
now is that nobody expects the narcotics issue to be seriously tackled in the near future.
This is a structure-based argument that should not be misinterpreted as the only factor
that explains the behavior of actors.
It may seem surprising that there is a strong reluctance to take actions against the
exuberant drug production and trade in Myanmar. After all, it would be an opportunity
to  limit  the  resources  from the  insurgent  groups that  allows  them to  maintain  their
military capabilities and, in the case of the UWSA, even enhances state-building. There
are  several  reasons  for  this  reluctance  in  which  the  political  and  the  economic
dimensions intertwine: the government is unlikely to address the drug issue because it
would  risk  undermining  both  the  NCA negotiations  as  well  as  the  already existing
ceasefires  with  groups  such  as  the  UWSA.  Potentially,  it  would  also  affect  its
relationship  with  the  militias.  The  government  and  the  Tatmadaw  consider  these
ceasefires  more  important  than  combating  the  drug  problem  (Lintner  2000:  23).
Imperative is therefore to avoid giving any economic incentives to pick up arms against
the government and Tatmadaw again rather than tackling the drug problem.
A second reason why the government and the Tatmadaw are unlikely to take
action against the drug production in the near future is of economic nature: the revenues
generated by the narcotics trade are too vast to be rejected by governments of states
with weak economies such as Myanmar or Laos (Arnold 2005: 212). Drug money is the
38 Interview with Tom Kramer, January 15th 2015.
39 Interview with Matti Ojanperä, January 16th 2015.
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backbone of Myanmar's economy and consequently, the government welcomes the cash
inflow since it constitutes a significant economic boost in capital. It even encourages
actors from the drug business to launder their money into legitimate businesses (see
above). Bertil Lintner (2000: 19) estimates that the amount of drug money that poured
between 1989 and 2000 into the country was several hundred million dollars, an amount
that has most likely increased because of the expansion of the opium cultivation and
drug production since 2006 and the increased efforts to encourage the investment of
drug  money in  Myanmar.  This  is  a  large  amount  of  money for  a  country  with  an
estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of 56.8 billion dollars in 2014 (World Bank
2014). The rise of conglomerates such as Asia World through drug revenues is not only
a welcome development for the government and the former insurgents that found their
way into the legal  economy,  it  also bears  a resemblance to the development  of the
economies of other countries in East and Southeast Asia.
What follows is that the current delicate constellation of actors stands and falls
with  the  massive  drug  producing  complex  in  Myanmar.  Changes  of  the  shadow
economic structures will affect the current situation in one way or another. This fact
highlights  not  only  how  important  drugs  have  become  for  maintaining  military
capabilities but also how much narcotics shape the conflict as well as civilian life and
society as a whole in some parts of the country, especially Shan state. Opium cultivation
and  the  refining  of  drugs  are  today  deeply  ingrained  in  the  structural  setup  of
Myanmar's peripheral societies and any alteration will have impacts on the relationship
of  conflict  actors  and various  segments  of  society.  Eradication  of  opium fields  and
opium bans in some parts of the country have, for example, wreaked havoc among the
vulnerable  civilian  population  in  Myanmar's  peripheries.  Ceasefire  deals  that  have
brought about at least limited forms of negative peace and relief to civilians in some
areas are likely to collapse when faced with serious efforts to tackle the drug problem
because they were built on the promises of relentless accumulation of wealth through
lucrative trade with opium and its derivatives. As long as the drug production remains
untouched, those actors who profit from it have no reason to spoil the national ceasefire
agreement or to break already existing ceasefires.
Since there seem to be no spoilers in sight whose reason to spoil would be the
protection of their business from peace or at least a ceasefire, it can be concluded that
drugs in the case of Myanmar are not fully in line with the common notion that natural
resources prolong and intensify violent conflict. Drugs in Myanmar are, however, not a
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clear argument for the opposite theory,  either. As a resource, drugs have played two
roles for violent conflict in different stages of the conflict. They are not the cause for the
onset of conflict but historically they have both prolonged and shortened conflict. The
KMT and CPB, for example, have utilized opium to maintain and enhance their military
capabilities  and  thus  improved  their  position  vis-à-vis  other  actors,  especially  the
government  and  its  army.  In  these  parts  of  the  Myanmar  civil  war,  drugs  have
functioned  as  an  amplifier  and  prolonged  violent  conflict.  Conversely,  the  armies
formed out of the CPB have agreed to ceasefires with the government in exchange for
unobstructed  exploitation  of  opium to  amass  wealth.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  drug
revenue has been used to improve the military capabilities, war did not occur between
for example the UWSA and the Tatmadaw. The promise of limitless exploitation of
opium has therefore shortened conflict between the government side and some of the
EAGs. This has been even more pronounced in the case of the militias because they
agreed to be put under the Tatmadaw's command and abandoned any political goals.
Opium as a resource is therefore connected to both prolongation and shortening
of  violent  conflict  in  Myanmar,  although  its  role  differs  in  different  stages  of  the
conflict. In the early decades since independence, opium has prolonged and exacerbated
the  conflict  by enabling  the opponents  of  the  government  to  improve their  military
prowess, at times even made some of the opposition armies superior to the Tatmadaw.
In later stages, especially since the CPB's downfall in 1989, opium has shortened violent
conflict between the government side and some of its opponents, namely those who
perceived a ceasefire as being more profitable than continued warfare. In the post-1989
conflict  environment,  spoiling  to  prevent  peace  is  unnecessary  because  even  a
comprehensive  peace  deal  would  not  threaten  the  lucrative  drug  business.  This,
however, does not mean that future conflict between current ceasefire parties can be
ruled out. As has been mentioned earlier, serious attempts to curb the opium cultivation
and the trade with drugs may lead to renewed outbreaks of violence and a collapse of
existing  ceasefires.  The  shadow  economic  structures  in  which  the  drug  trade  is
embedded cannot be changed without upsetting actors and the only chance to prevent
Myanmar  from descending  into  even  deeper  levels  of  violence  might  be  the  slow
transformation of shadow economic structures and the co-opting of drug entrepreneurs
into legal businesses, even though that might violate normative standards predominant
in contemporary development politics.
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6. Reflection: The Spoiler Concept
The last thing to do is to discuss the merit of the spoiler concept in the context of this
thesis and to reflect on the concept and on its normative underpinnings. Both are equally
important but especially the second relevant to answer the theoretical research question
posed in an earlier chapters.
6.1. The Spoiler Concept and the Myanmar Civil War
Undoubtedly,  the  decision  to  limit  the  thesis  to  natural  resources  had  far-reaching
consequences  for  the  design  of  this  study and the  choice  of  narcotics  as  a  conflict
resource, and not for example jade or timber, has delimited the scope of the thesis even
further. The decision to focus on narcotics was influenced by the belief that a lack of
delimitation  would  have  exceeded  the  length  of  a  Master's  thesis.  Looking  at  the
Myanmar civil war through the lens of the spoiler concept as a whole would have been
in retrospect, however, a viable option, too. 
While working on this thesis, it became apparent that currently no actor is likely
to spoil to protect its drug trading activities but that does not mean that there are no
spoilers in the conflict at all.  Only the claim that the ceasefire process is threatened
because some actors perceive it as detrimental to their businesses could be falsified but
plenty of political incentives to spoil it remain. And the very same actors that do not
have reasons to spoil because of the aforementioned reasons may still become spoilers
for political reasons. In fact, spoilers are part of the conflict and they are one of the
reasons why the conflict  has  outlasted other  conflicts  that  have  started  at  the same
time.40 
It was difficult to adequately describe this dichotomy because the thesis' research
design excluded the political option. Applying the spoiler concept to the conflict as a
whole  would  have  made  it  less  difficult  to  navigate  through the  complex  nexus  of
political, economic and ideological structures and frames that make the conflict what it
is. A more inclusive approach would have had the leeway to look at the political and
ideological aspects as well  and conclude in a more adequate manner that a specific
conflict party may be unlikely to spoil the ceasefire process for economic reasons but
40 Interview with Martin Smith, April 20th 2015.
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that this same party may have plenty of political reasons to attempt to undermine it.
This relates to the core of the Myanmar civil war: it is still primarily a political
conflict and the economic dimension is only one of its many aspects. This thesis looked
at the economic aspect because it was and still is assumed that violent conflict opens up
opportunities  to  make some form of profit  from the conflict  and that  the economic
aspect cannot be neglected when the goal is to understand the conflict in its entirety.
Against  this  backdrop, the results  of the study are deemed relevant  and this  critical
reflection should not be interpreted as a relativization the study results or the study as a
whole. But it should never be forgotten that the conflict is political in nature and that it
should not be reduced to being only about resources and business opportunities. Or, as
Bertil Litner (2015-05-05) puts it:  the conflict is in danger of being depoliticized by
foreign observers and members of what he labels the “peace-industrial complex” who,
along  with  the  international  audience,  long for  an  end of  this  long-lasting  conflict.
Martin Smith echoes these concerns about the pressure and desire by the international
audience to finally see development and warns that this pressure might not only have
disastrous consequences for the process but also risks supporting the incumbent regime
and its position at the expense of the ethnic nationalities.41
The application of the spoiler concept has produced an interesting result: despite
plenty  opportunities  to  make  material  profit  and  to  draw  political  power  from the
exuberant opium cultivation and despite opium having a conflict prolonging effect in
some  stages  of  the  conflict,  none  of  those  who  profit  from the  business  seems  to
perceive a ceasefire or even proper peace as a threat. On the contrary, the Myanmar civil
war demonstrates probably like no other conflict the extent and society-shaping impacts
that shadow economic activities can reach. It also provides ample empirical evidence
that such activities, and especially the drug trade, can coexist with negative peace. As
cases such as the militias or the UWSA show, negative peace can be perceived as more
desirable than continued warfare if the alternatives are profitable enough. In the case of
the  UWSA,  the  advantages  of  negative  peace  can  outweigh  the  decision  to  make
military advances even under the very favorable circumstances of 1989.
In  the  light  of  the  study results  the  spoiler  concept  was  a  good choice  that
produced satisfactory results but the scope of the study could have been wider as has
been said before. The concept proved to be a functioning framework to analyze peace
processes  of  different  kinds  of  forms,  ceasefire  talks  that  establish  negative  peace
41 Ibid.
64
included.  In  this  context,  not  only  the  concept  and  its  application  to  conflict  is
interesting but also the process of synthesizing a functioning concept out of the different
approaches that can be found in the literature. The way the concept has evolved since
Stedman first published his article is a prime example of evolutionary social science
research which is admittedly theoretical but also oriented very closely towards peace
process realities. Although the perspective might be different, reflected in the actor vs.
structure debate, the different concepts discuss real cases of peace processes such as the
ones in Mozambique or Cambodia. Theorizing the spoiler concept was therefore done
against  the  backdrop  of  real  life  events  and  empirical  data  and  not  hypothetical
scenarios.  The  concept  fits  well  into  the  many practice-oriented  branches  of  peace
research because of its inherent proximity to real peace processes.
The  challenge  in  this  thesis  was  to  synthesize  out  of  the  literature  an  own
concept that covers the essential aspects that are needed to make it work in the context
of the Myanmar civil  war, a highly complex conflict  largely neglected by academic
research and politics  outside East  and Southeast  Asia.  The decision to  include both
actors  and structures  into the  concept  was based on the proposition  of  Nilsson and
Söderberg Kovacs' article from 2011. While drafting the concept and applying it to the
conflict it became clear that the debate about whether actors or structures play a more
important  role  in  determining  behavior  is  not  only  unnecessary  but  also
counterproductive. In reality, actors are affected by opportunity structures but they may
also  defy them and make  decisions  that  are  not  in  line  with  rational  cost  and  risk
analyses.  After  all,  the  human  being  is  able  to  behave  both  rational  and  irrational.
Claiming that it is either individuals or structures that determine behavior prevents a
proper analysis and understanding of conflicts and the behavior of conflict parties.
Notwithstanding the fact that the study concluded that spoilers might emerge if
the  circumstances  (meaning  structures)  change,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the
behavior in light of such a change will be always also affected by other factors such as
individual character´of the leadership. While some actors might resort to spoiling when
faced with serious attempts to curb the drug production, others might decide that it is
not worth it, even though the opportunity structures allow them to successfully throw
Myanmar's peripheries back into violent conflict. This analysis, however, is a challenge
for another piece of work, should spoilers emerge.
The conclusion from these reflections is that the spoiler concept the way it is
theorized  right  now offers  a  proper  method  to  analyze  conflict  with,  as  long  as  it
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acknowledges the importance of both individual behavior and structures that may affect
behavior.  This  does  not,  however,  mean  that  the  concept  is  without  flaws  or  not
problematic.  Especially the  aforementioned normative  underpinnings  that  have  been
criticized in the literature by some scholars pose challenges to the concept.
6.2. The normative Foundation and Subjectivity of Behavior
The normative foundation of the spoiler concept has now been mentioned several times
and it is time to discuss it as the final part of this thesis. The concept has been used in
this  thesis  despite  the  critique  that  it  is  a  normative  concept  which  only  works  in
connection with the liberal  peacebuilding paradigm. There are  two reasons why the
concept was applied in this thesis without considering this factor. The first is that this
thesis is primarily concerned with the Myanmar civil war. The concept has been used
because it  was  assumed that  it  is  likely to  produce meaningful  and tangible  results
despite its objectionable characteristics. The second reason is that as of now, nobody has
proposed another version of the concept which is not tied to the liberal peacebuilding
paradigm. The author of this thesis was not of the opinion that he could single-handedly
revolutionize  the  concept  and  hence  an  existing  form but  modified  version  of  the
concept was used.
This  final  subchapter  is  meant  to  reflect  on  the  concept,  its  advantages  and
disadvantages and to address some of the possible gaps and shortcomings that arise
from the concept's  current  theoretical  foundation.  In the best  case,  some useful  bits
might contribute to the refinement of the concept.
Before delving deeper into the matter, it might be helpful to recap shortly the
major  critique  of  the  concept.  Nilsson  and  Söderberg  Kovacs  (2010:  609)  sum the
critique up by stating:
“It has even been suggested that the concept derives its definition, and gains
its meaning, only in relation to the core assumptions of the so-called liberal
peacebuilding paradigm [...]. Consequently, actors that behave according to
the expectations of this normative framework will be considered to raise fair
and legitimate demands, whereas those that disagree will per definition be
viewed as spoilers, which in turn determines how the key peace custodians
respond to various actors in the peace process.”
The quote highlights the interconnection of the predominant paradigm and the factor
that subjectivity plays in the perception of behavior. What the authors do not address
and  what  should  be  added  is  that  the  problem of  subjectivity  is  not  limited  to  the
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theoretical foundation of the concept but that it is reflected already in the name of its
main  object  of  study:  the  word  'spoiler'  is  a  judgmental  and  evaluative  term  that
predisposes the analysis to possible flaws because the label that an actor receives will
inevitably frame the way the user of the concept looks at the actor and its demands.
Approaching a peace process with the spoiler concept might also have the negative side
effect that the user wants to find a spoiler because the concept posits and presupposes
that spoilers are a natural part of every peace process.
While it is undoubtedly true that some actors are likely to try to sabotage or
shape a peace process, the ways in which the different spoiler concepts have been used
risk labeling more actors spoilers as probably deserve it. Any demands that deviate from
what  is  generally perceived acceptable are  considered spoiling behavior,  even if  the
actor who raises them is genuinely interested in a peaceful settlement but feels that its
interests are not considered. Within the framework, the standard response to deviating
behavior  is  to  put  the  label  'spoiler'  on  an  actor  which  puts  it  into  a  political  and
semantic predicament. 
This label is difficult to cast off, even if the demands raised are not unreasonably
high  or  even  if  there  is  no  threat  of  force  involved  in  case  the  demands  are  not
considered. A spoiler is a spoiler in the current framework if it is not playing by certain
rules. The actor which is identified as a spoiler, however, might have not agreed to these
rules and the peace process that is looked at might work according to a different logic
than the liberal  understanding of peace which includes certain crucial characteristics
such  as  democracy and  rule  of  law.  The  concept  should,  under  any circumstances,
acknowledge that every peace process works according to different values, traditions
and is embedded in different cultural contexts which all might deviate from Western
understandings of peace and peace processes. This criticism of top-down approaches
and assumed universality of Western values has also been voiced in general discussion
about contemporary peacebuilding strategies (see for example Barnett et al. 2011: 36).
A quick fix or panacea to these problems cannot be offered in this thesis. It is
neither the time nor the place to offer an elaborated concept of peace processes that is
free from the implications of liberal peacebuilding and it is questionable whether such a
concept is even feasible. Instead, small ideas are outlined which should be considered
when peace processes are analyzed.
The first thing that should be reconsidered is the name of the object of study. The
term 'spoiler'  and its  semantic implications might be a bigger problem than that the
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concept depends on the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. The term 'spoiler' should not be
abandoned but  the  concept  should  offer  a  more  nuanced  view on actors  instead  of
classifying anybody who raises controversial demands as a spoiler. Spoilers should be
those  actors  that  undeniably  try  to  sabotage  a  peace  process  for  reasons  such  as
economic profit by violent means. This means that only those should be considered as
spoilers who display behavior that clearly favors war over peace. An actor that does not
use force when its demands are not met but that still risks to bring down a peace process
because the other conflict parties threaten to leave the negotiation table should not be
called a spoiler. Such actors might have been not part of processes in Mozambique or
Cambodia but the Myanmar case clearly has some smaller and larger actors involved
that would clearly favor peace over war and that would resort only to fighting when
threatened by the Tatmadaw or other conflict parties (an example would be the KNU).
What could be an alternative to the current name? Greenhill  and Major have
termed their model a 'capabilities-based model' which is an improvement but they still
use a very broad concept of what spoiling behavior is and reduce the reason for spoiling
to cost and risk analyses. An alternative would be to widen the scope and draft a name
along the lines of 'peace process analysis model' or 'peace process and obstacle analysis.'
Why should the scope be widened? Because in any case, all models focus on the peace
process as a whole and stress that spoilers are merely a part of peace processes. It is
questionable  whether  a  single  part  should  be  eponymous  for  the  concept.  These
proposed  names  are  undoubtedly improvable  but  treating  spoilers  as  what  they  are
semantically, only a part of larger process, in connection with a more careful use of the
word spoiler might take away a small part of the problematic aspects of the concept.
Such  a  change  would  not  free  the  concept  of  claims  that  the  liberal
peacebuilding paradigm is the deciding factor. It might be difficult (or impossible) to re-
theorize the concept as long as contemporary peacebuilding strategies remain what they
are.  As  the  approaches  to  peacebuilding  evolve  and  as  the  understanding  of  peace
changes, the ways peace processes are planned, conducted and analyzed will change,
too. Even if the nature of peace processes changes, spoilers are likely to remain a part of
peace processes indeed, at least in the most conflict-ridden and militarized cases. But a
more careful, nuanced use of the word spoiler in connection with acknowledging that
peace talks must adapt to the cultural context of the conflict could be a small step in the
right direction. When contemporary peacebuilding strategies become more flexible and
case-dependent,  the current understanding of spoilers is  likely to change along with
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them.
This  process  is  nothing  hypothetical  or  a  mere  wish  for  the  future.  On  the
contrary,  the  changes  are  happening  slowly  and  incrementally  already.  With  new
countries and regions assuming more global prominence and influence, the hegemony
of  liberal,  Western  values  is  likely to  decline  in  the  future.  And this  will  not  be a
negative  development  because  contemporary  understandings  of  peace,  freedom and
human and state interaction will not be replaced but rather enriched and improved with
values of other cultures. Western values, concepts and traditions will merge with the
ones of other cultures and create new ways of handling and mitigating conflict. An all-
encompassing, universal concept applied to conflicts in different cultural contexts is not
feasible and bound to fail. Future ways of looking at conflicts and peace will hopefully
be more inclusive, situation- and culture-dependent, less hegemonic and perceived as
more legitimate by those who are affected by them.
7. Conclusion
The thesis at hand pursued the question whether or not Myanmar's nationwide ceasefire
process  is  threatened  by actors  who  perceive  it  as  a  threat  to  their  narcotics  trade
activities.  The  analysis  was  conducted  by using  the  spoiler  concept  which  aims  at
analyzing peace  processes  with  special  emphasis  being  paid  to  actors  who perceive
peace  as  a  threat  to  their  interest  or  worldview.  The  analysis  is  embedded  into  a
theoretical framework of the role of natural resources in civil wars and shadow and war
economies.
New questions for future research spawned by the findings of the thesis clearly
point  into the direction of other natural resources  such as gems and timber and the
environmental  consequences  of  large-scale  mining and logging activities.  And on a
more general  level,  the connection between conflict  and the environment  should be
explored more in the future and connected to classic peace and conflict research theories
revolving around the concepts of structural violence and positive peace. The importance
of an intact environment for the well-being of humans and animals alike is evident and
should move further into the center of attention of future studies that deal with any case,
not only Myanmar or gems and timber.
The  analysis  has  resulted  in  the  observation  that  the  country's  nationwide
ceasefire  process  is  not  threatened  by actors  who  are  implicated  in  the  trade  with
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narcotics  such  as  opium,  heroin  and  amphetamine-style  stimulants  (ATS).  This  is
because the current circumstances and the existing ceasefires favor the trade instead of
curbing it. None of those who profit from the trade with narcotics have to perceive the
ceasefire process as a threat to their business. On the contrary, ceasefires, understood in
this  thesis  as  a  form of  negative  peace,  have  proved  to  be  more  profitable  for  the
ceasefire groups than continued violent conflict. The reasons for this lie in the nature of
the  already  existing  ceasefires  which  allow  undisturbed  business  opportunities  in
exchange for not fighting the government and Myanmar's military, the Tatmadaw. The
nationwide ceasefire  that  is  currently negotiated is  unlikely to  be different  than the
already existing ceasefires and thus, the drug trade is likely to continue.  Drugs as a
natural resource have since 1989 shortened violent conflict, not prolonged it. This is in
line with Ross'  (2004) alternative theory that  natural  resources  are  not  only able  to
prolong conflicts  but  also to  shorten it  if  the circumstances  allow it.  Clearly,  many
groups  that  were  fighting  the  successive  Myanmar  governments  have  agreed  to
ceasefires in order to exploit opium and its derivatives undisturbed. Before 1989, opium
has both intensified and prolonged conflict because rebel forces could purchase better
military equipment and recruit more soldiers with its revenues. Opium was, however,
not a reason for the civil war and is therefore not connected to the onset of conflict.
The  main  reason why spoiling  in  order  to  protect  the  own drug business  is
unlikely in the foreseeable future is that the incumbent government has no interest in
seriously curbing the opium cultivation in Myanmar. This is because such a move would
undermine the existing ceasefires which the government and the Tatmadaw consider
extremely important. The government furthermore welcomes the drug money since it
constitutes a significant boost to Myanmar's economy. It even actively encourages drug
entrepreneurs  to  launder  their  money  into  the  legal  economy.  This  resembles  the
development process of the economies of other countries in East and Southeast Asia
such as Hong Kong and China in which opium has served as a means to accumulate
starting capital before venturing into other business sectors.
Despite  there  being  currently  no  reasons  to  spoil  the  nationwide  ceasefire
process for reasons related to the drug business, there are plenty of political reasons on
different sides to prevent the ceasefire from materializing. These political reasons were,
however, not the topic of the thesis and thus not further explored. The focus on opium as
a conflict resource has also blanked out the role that other natural resources have played
and still played in the Myanmar civil war. Resources such as jade, timber and gemstones
70
have been used to finance insurgencies and exploring the way they affect intensity and
duration of conflict  are certainly an interesting topic for another thesis or for future
research. Other theoretical frameworks might be more useful for that purpose than the
spoiler concept.
In retrospect it became clear that it would have been more practical to look at the
ceasefire process as a whole instead of picking only the aspect of the drug business. But
this  must not be understood as a relativization of the study or its findings since the
spoiler concept worked well in the context it was applied and produced tangible results.
The concept is, however, not without flaws. The alleged criticism that the spoiler
concept works only in connection with the liberal peacebuilding paradigm echoes the
general  criticism  aimed  at  peacebuilding  and  its  liberal  foundation.  This  thesis
attempted in the closing remarks about the spoiler concept to offer small improvements
such as renaming the concept to take away a portion of the inherent subjective judgment
and  evaluation  of  behavior.  This,  however,  cannot  solve  the  general  criticism  the
concept is subjected to. It is unlikely that the spoiler concept can be re-theorized without
the liberal peacebuilding foundation and without fundamentally changing the concept. 
The final part of the discussion of the concept, then, suggests that the spoiler
concept will most likely change along with the readjustment of international politics in
the wake of the rise of new influential actors such as the famous BRICSs-bloc, the rise
of  Southest  Asia  and of  parts  of  Latin  America  and Africa.  As  predominant  liberal
values merge and mingle with values from other cultures, the way peace processes are
understood, looked at, analyzed, constructed and conducted will change and so will the
concepts aimed at analyzing those actors that try to undermine them.
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Annex
Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) member organizations:
1. Arakan Liberation Party
2. Arakan National Council
3. Arakan Army
4. Chin National Front 
5. Democratic Karen Benevolent Army 
6. Karenni National Progressive Party 
7. Chairman, Karen National Union 
8. KNU/KNLA Peace Council 
9. Lahu Democratic Union 
10. Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army 
11. New Mon State Party 
12. Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization 
13. Palaung State Liberation Front 
14. Shan State Progress Party 
15. Wa National Organiztion 
16. Kachin Independence Organization 
United Nartionalities Federal Council (UNFC) member organizations:
1. Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) 
2. New Mon State Party (NMSP) 
3. Shan State Army-North (SSPP /SSA) 
4. Karen National Union (KNU) 
5. Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) 
6. Chin National Front (CNF)
7. Lahu Democratic Union (LDU)
8. Arakan National Council (ANC)
9. Pa-o National Liberational Organization (PNLO)
10.Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) aka Palaung State Liberation Front 
(PSLF)
11.Wa National Organization (WNO)
(previous member Kachin National Organization has merged with the KIO)
Non-UNFC
Organizations that follow the UNFC's leadership:
1. Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) aka Rakhine State liberation Party
2. Democratic Karen Buddist Army- Brigade 5 (DKBA-5) [follows KNU’s 
political leadership]
3. KPC, KNU/KNLA Peace Council 
4. Kayan New Land Party KNLP
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Organizations that unofficially follow the UNFC principles and plan:
1. United Wa State Arm (UWSA)
2. National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)
3. Shan State Army-South (SSA-S)
4. Arakan Army (AA)
5. All Burma Student's Democratic Front (ABSDF)
6. Mergui-Tavoy United Front (MTUF)
